JUDGMENT

Scott-Smith, J. - The plaintiff-firm residing in Gujranwala arranged with the defendant-firm residing in Calcutta to purchase certain goods and send them to Gujranwala;. the plaintiff-firm was to send the money to the defendant-firm in Calcutta. The plaintiff remitted Rs. 800 to the defendant and-the latter consigned the goods to itself in Gujranwala sending the Railway receipt by value payable post against a sum of Rs. 314, which was the balance due for the goods purchased, The plaintiff refused to take delivery of the Railway receipt through the value payable post and it was returned to the defendant. The plaintiff then sent the balance of Rs. 314 to the defendant and asked the latter to instruct the Railway Authorities at Gujranwala to deliver the goods to the plaintiff. Correspondence shows that frequent requests were made to the Railway Authorities to deliver the goods but without success and it appears that the goods have been lost. The plaintiff, therefore, sued the defendant for return of Rs. 1,114 remitted to the defendant. The suit was instituted in the Court of a Suboidinate Junge at Gujranwala, who held that he had no jurisdiction, no part of the cause of action having arisen at Gujranwala. The lower appellate Court, upheld the order in appeal and the plaintiff has, therefore, come to this Court on the Revision 5 de.

2. Counsel for the respondent refers to ChanduLal v. Kokomal (1921) 43 All. 334, in which it was held that an order of this sort could not be the subject of revision. A different view was taken by a majority of the Judges in a Madras case reported as Vuppuluri Atchayya v. Sri Kanchumarti Venkata Seetarama Chandra Rao (1916) 39 Mad. 195, and also in Ram Labhaya v. Btshan Das (1909) 77 P.R. 1909, and in a single Bench jujgment of this Court reported as Durga Parshad-Mutsaddi Lal v. Rulia Mal-Dogar Mal 1922 Lab. 100. In my opinion interference in revision is ordinarily inadvisable in a case of this sort and should only be exercised in exceptional cases to remedy an injustice; see in this connection Ram Labhaya v. Bishan Das. Now, if the plaintiff is by law entitled to institute this case in Gujranwala it would be a grave injustice to him to insist on its trial in Calcutta which would put him to very great expense, merely because the lower Courts have erroneously held that the Gujranwala Court has no jurisdiction. I will, therefore, proceed to dispose of the application on the merits.

3. Both the Courts below have omitted to notice that the Railway receipt was originally sent by the defendant to the plaintiff in Gujranwala through the medium of value payable post. They have also omitted to notice that the goods were consigned by the defendant-firm to itself in Gujranwala. It is, therefore, clear that the goods at Gujranwala were in possession of the Railway Authorities as agents of the defendant-firm and that the latter still had control over them and that the plaintiff had no control over them. Whatever the original contract may have been it was modified by what subsequently occurred. It does not appear that the parties ever agreed that the value payable post should be used for the purpose of recovering the whole or part of the money due from the plaintiff to the defendant, and this was why the plaintiff did not take delivery of the Railway Receipt upon payment of Rs. 314. Instead of that, the plaintiff sent the money remaining due to the firm in Calcutta and asked that firm to give the necessary directions to the Railway for the goods to be delivered. The goods, therefore, had to be delivered to the plaintiff in Gujranwala, and the non-delivery of the goods is certainly a part of the cause of action. I, therefore, hold that the Gujranwala Courts have jurisdiction to try this case, I allow the revision and, setting aside the orders of the lower Courts, remand the case to the Subordinate Judge at Gujranwala for disposal in accordance with law. Costs in this Court shall be costs in the case.