JUDGMENT

Broadway, J. - This petition for revision has arisen out of certain proceedings under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, in connection with some agricultural land situate in village Gilawa in the District of Jhang.

2. The proceedings were instituted by Bawa Dani Chand who alleged that he had been in possession of the lands in question since 1904, and that Bahawala and others, kmins of the village, had forcibly taken possession of the same on the 14th March 1921.

3. On the 21st March 1921 the Magistrate passed the order contemplated by Section 145 (I), Criminal Procedure Code, and called on the parties to file their written statements and produce evidence.

4. On the 6th December 1921 the Magistrate passed the final order in the case.

5. He held that the complainant had been in continuous possession of the land till the 14th March 1921 when he had been forcibly dispossessed by Bahawala and his companions. He, therefore, acting under the first proviso to Clause (4) of Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, treated the complainant as if he had been in possession at the date of the order calling for written statements, i.e., 21st March 1921, and then proceeded as follows:

Accordingly, under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, I direct that the complainants' possession of the disputed land be restored, and further forbid any interference with bis possession till he is evicted in due course of law.

6. The kamin filed a petition for revision in the Court of the District Magistrate which was rejected and they have now come up to this Court through Mr. Ram Cand Manchanda For the respondent I have heard Dr. Gokal Chand Narang.

7. The first point raised was, that the whole of the proceedings were vitiated by the omission to give the notice to the petitioners that is required by Section 145 (I), Criminal Procedure Code. A reference to the record shows that on the 6th May 1921 the Magistrate recorded an order in which it is specifically set out that notice to the parties had been issued in accordance with law. I, therefore, hold that there is no force in this objection. It was then contended that the order directing that "the complainant's possession of the disputed land be restored was bad inasmuch as the Magistrate had no power to make such an order.

8. In this connection, my attention was drawn to Kaku v. Harnaman [1917] 28 P.W.R.C. 1917, Emperor v. Kameshar [1904] 27 All. 300, Tulshi Ram v. Akbar Ahmad [1915] 37 All. 651 and Moore v. Monoranjan Guha 12 C.W.N. 696. A reference to these authorities shows that they are in point and in them it is clearly laid down that, in proceedings under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, a Magistrate has no jurisdiction to order restoration of possession.

9. The Section 45 itself contains no provision to the effect that a party in whose favour the order is made is to be put into possession nor does this section provide any machinery by which the successful party can have his possession restored by the Court. All that the Magistrate is empowered to do is to declare that he is entitled to possession.

10. At the same time, if a party is declared to be entitled to possession, and the world at large is forbidden to disturb his possession, he would be entitled to take possession and no one would have any right to interfere with his doing so. It follows, therefore, that, though the order of the Magistrate in this case is technically erroneous, the ultimate result is practically the same. The order being wrong, however must be amended, and I accordingly eliminate the words directing restoration and substitute therefor a declaration that the complainant is entitled to possession. In all other respects the order will stand.