JUDGMENT

Harrison, J. - The defendants in this case present this second appeal relying on a certificate granted by the District Judge regarding the existence of a custom, amongst the Muhammadan Bhatti Rajputs of the Dasuya Tahsil in the Hoshiarpur District, as to whether a sonless proprietor can adopt his brother's son. Counsel also wishes to argue the question of whether in this case it has been proved that the sonless proprietor actually did adopt his nephew. On this point there is a clear finding of fact and he can only urge that the whole of the evidence on the subjects was not considered by the District Judge. His only reason for saying so is that the District Judge has not recapitulated in his judgment every piece of evidence which is on the record. In the first place, this is not in my opinion, a sufficient reason for holding that the District Judge did not consider every piece of evidence and, even if it could be shown that be did not do so, there would still be no justification for attacking in second appeal the findings of fact which are certainly based on evidence. As to the existence of the custom, the onus doubtless lay upon the plaintiff and in support of his case he produced the Riwaj-i-am of the Hoshiarpur District relying more especially on the answer to question 69, three decided cases described as page 6, page 7 and page 8 on the record, Article 35 of the Rattigan's Customary Law. Beg v. Allah Ditto (1917) 44 Cal. 749, Hassan v. Samma (1874) 54 P.R. 1874, and the various instances quoted by Mr. Humphreys in his Riwaj-i-am, of the existence of the custom amongst Muhammadan Rajputs in this and other Tahsils of this district. Both sides rely on Umar Bakhsh v. Sohne Khan (1919) 110 P.R. 1919 which appears to me to be of special value to the plaintiff, for in that case, in spite of the general entry made by Mr. Humphreys in the Riwaj-i-am, to the effect that the Muhammadan Rajputs of the Garhshankar Tahsil did not follow custom in this matter, the Chief Court held that it was established by instances that they did. It is true that in the course of that judgment the value of the Riwaj-i-am was discounted, but on the whole I think the judgment helps the plaintiff more than it does the defendants. The answer to question 69 in the Riwaj-i am regarding adoption by Muhammadan Rajputs runs as follows : Rajputs of Tahsil Dasuya. In the absence of collaterals, only a daughter's son and sister's son can be adopted; no other persons outside the got are eligible. "Counsel contends that this means that a man who has collaterals cannot adopt at all and, if he has none, can adopt his daughter's son or sister's son. The wording is not very happy but, if the answer be read with the context, it is clear that it means that the sonless proprietor can adopt a collateral and, if he has no collateral, can go further a field and adopt his daughter or sister's son. Article 35 of Rattigan's Customary Law explains the position generally as regards Muhammadan agriculturists in the Central and Eastern Punjab. It is clear that, amongst the purer Muhammadan tribes, especially those residing in the North-Western districts, the influence of their religion has been more marked, but in the Central Punjab, Muhammadan agricultrists as a whole have retained the oustom of adoption. This is more especially the case with regard to Muhammadan Jats converted from Hinduism, and Sir William Rattigan definitely places the onus of disproving the existence of the custom among such Jats on the man who denies it. The position with regard to Muhammadan Rajputs is not so strongly established but even amongst them in this area of the Province the more general practice is clearly to recognise the right of adoption. Out of the decided cases page 6, page 7 and page 8 one only is among Bhatti Rajputs, namely, page 6, and comes from this very village, but, as pointed out by the learned District Judge, it is of no value inasmuch as the property was self-acquired. Page 7 a