JUDGMENT

Brasher, J. - The plaintiffs in this case have instituted a suit under Section 92, Civil Procedure Code, against Mahant Kirpal Singh. The plaintiffs applied under S10 of Act XIV of 1920 that the defendant should be ordered to pay into Court Rs. 1,000 for their expenses in prosecuting the uit.

2. The District Judge passed an order on January 6th, 1922 directing the defendant to furnish security for Rs. 1.000 within three days and the order also stated that if the defendant failed to furnish the security he would be directed to pay the amount in cash.

3. The defendant complied with the order by furnishing two sureties who each undertook to pay Rs. 500 if the defendant should fail to pay this sum when called upon to do so. On the March 17th, 1922, the plaintiffs filed a second application purporting to be under Section 10, Act XIV of 1920, in which they stated that a large sum of money was required for a prosecution of the case and asked that the defendant and his sureties should be asked to deposit Rs. 1000. The learned District Judge passed an order on March 22nd, 1922, directing the defendant to pay into Court Re. 500 before the next hearing of the suit The defendant is now applying for revision of this order, and a cross-petition has been filed by the plaintiffs in which they ask that the amount which the defendant is required to deposit should be increased from Rs 500 to Rs. 1.000.

4. Notwithstanding the fact that this cross-petition has been filed by the plaintiffs it is contended on their behalf that no revision is competent. I think, however, that this objection must be overruled. In Pandit Rama Kant v. Ragdeo [1897] 60 P.R. 1897 it was held that the word 'case' in Section 22 (now 115), Civil Procedure Code, does not necessarily mean the whole case and the order in question appears to form a particular branch of the case which is quite distinct from the suit.

5. Section 10 of Act XIV of 1920 provides that the Court trying a suit under Section 92, Civil Procedure Code may direct the defendant either to furnish security for any expenditure incurred or likely to be incurred by the plaintiff] in instituting and maintaining such, suit, or to deposit from any money in his bands as trustee of the trust to which the suit relates such sum as such Court considers sufficient to meet such expenditure in whole or in part." These words can only mean that the option of furnishing the security or depositing the money rests with the defendant. The Court can order that he shall do one of these two things but it cannot specify which he is to do. The order of March 17th, 1922, therefore, if it is to be treated as one under Section 10 of Act XIV of 1020, is an illegal one since the defendant was required to deposit the money and was given no option.

6. Moreover, assuming that the Court was competent to pass a second order under that section in connection with the same suit and that it could order the deposit of money, it could only direct the defendant to make the deposit from money in his hands as trustee and the defendant could not be required to pay any money from his own pocket.

7. The learned Counsel for the plaintiffs has not attempted to dispute that the order, if passed under S 10, would be illegal. He contends however, that the order was one passed in execution of the previous order. It is argued that the order requiring the defendant to deposit the amount was a preliminary step towards enforcing payment from the sureties. Section 11 (i) enacts that the provisions of the Cods of Civil Procedure relating to the execution of decrees shall, so far as they are applicable, apply to the execution of orders under the Act. When, however, security had been furnished the previous order had been complied with and no order rem lined which should ed executed. The case is quite different from one where security for costs [has been taken under the Code of civil Procedure. When security for costs has been taken an order may subsepuently be passed