JUDGMENT

Broadway, J. - On the 29th January, 1913 one Ali Bakhsh sold certain lands to Allah Dad for Rs. 650 and executed a deed of sale which was duly registered.

2. On the same day an agreement was executed by Allah Dad in favour of Ali Bakhsh under which he undertook to re-convey the said lands to Ali Bakhsh if he repaid him the sum of Rs. 650 within a period of 10 years. This document was drawn up on an eight-annas stamped paper but was not registered.

3. One Ghulam Muhammad brought a suit for possession of the lands so sold claiming to be entitled to pre-empt and was granted a decree.

4. On the 7th February, 1920 Ali Bakhsh brought a suit against Ghulam Muhammad and Allah Dad asking for a decree for specific performance of the agreement to re-convey entered into by the original vendee, Allah Dad, urging that it was binding on the pre-emptor, Ghulam Muhammad.

5. The trial Court held that the agreement was entirely separate from the sale and did not in any way affect it, and that its was not binding on Ghulam Muhammad being a personal covenant affecting All Bakhsh alone. It also held that the document was inadmissible in evidence for want of registration and that the bona fides of the transactions was doubtful. The plaintiff's suit was, therefore, dismissed and he appealed to the District Court.

6. The learned District Judge, without going into the question of the admissibility or otherwise of the said agreement, held that the pre-emptor was only bound by the liabilities and obligations created by the deed of sale and upheld the decree of the trial Court.

7. Ali Bakhsh has now come up to this Court in second appeal through Mr. Ghulam Rasul. It seems to me that the view taken by the learned District Judge is correct. The sale of the land was an out and out one as evidenced by the deed. No doubt the pre-emptor stands in the shoes of the vendee and is bound by all the conditions and obligations by which the vendee is bound. It seems to me, however, that these conditions and obligations must be found in the deed of sale and cannot be looked for in any subsequent document which does not create any interest in the lands sold.

8. In the present case it is admitted that the agreement does not create any right, title or interest in the land and is purely a personal covenant. It is on this ground that immunity from registration is claimed for the document.

9. Mr. Ghulam Rasul, however, contended that it was the intention of the vendor and vendee to create a mortgage by conditional sale, but that as that was illegal and prohibited by the law in the Punjab, this device was entered into. If I am to be guided by Abe intention, then it seems to me that I am bound by the finding of the learned District Judge on the question and he has held that the parties intended and effected a sale.

10. In any event, I am of opinion that the sale was a complete transaction in itself and that any subsequent agreement (though entered into immediately after the execution of the sale deed) cannot be read into the conveyance so as to vary its terms and in fact conditions or obligations which would be binding on the pre-emptor. In this view I am supported to some extent by the decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in Muhammad Mir v. Faizul Hassan (1818) 74 P.R. 1918, as also by Gurunath Balaji Mutalik v. Yamanava Nalarao (1911) 35 Bom. 358. I consider the agreement in this case only created a covenant personal to the vendee, Allah Dad, and quite separate from the sale transaction itself, and was, therefore, not binding on Ghulam Muhammad. I accordingly dismiss this appeal, but as no one has appeared for the respondents, I make no ordor as to costs.