JUDGMENT

Broadway, J. - In a pre-emption decree, passed on the 31st May 1920, it was ordered that the pre-emptor should pay into Court a sum of Rs. 1,500 and costs within three Months from the date of the decree, The pre-emptor had already deposited Rs. 300 in Court and within the prescribed time he paid in the balance of Rs. 1,200 but omitted to file the costs. The vendees thereupon urged that the suit should be dismissed. The Court of first instance gave effect to this plea and against this the preemptor preferred an appeal to the District Judge who found that the decree was in no way ambiguous and clearly required the preemptor to deposit the costs as well as the preemption money within the specified period of three months. He, however came to the conclusion that the parcha given to the preemptor was a little misleading and, acting under Section 151, Civil Procedure Code, extended the time for payment of the costs. Against this order the vendee has come up to this Court in second appeal through Mr. Nanak Chand. The respondents have been represented by Mr. Jalaluddin.

2. Reliance is placed on Kanhaya Lal v. Mohammad Shaft Khan [1913] 3 P.W.R. 1913 as giving the Court power to extend time. That case, however, is clearly distinguishable, for there the decree, which was passed under Order 20, Rule 14, Civil Procedure Code did not include the costs as part of the money to be paid in by the date fixed. A reference to the parcha said to have been given to the appellant is not very clear. No parcha was produced in the Court of first instance and the grounds of appeal contained no reference to the existence of such a document. As pointed out by Mr. Nanak Chand, such a piece of paper is obtainable at any time without any serious difficulty. If, as a matter of fact, the appellant had been misled by any such parcha it is this document that would have been the basis of his claim for extension of time. As pointed out in Kanhaya Lal v. Mohammad Shafii Khan)) it is the duty of the decree-holder in a pre-emption suit to take all precautions and make! sure that the decree passed in his favour is strictly complied with. As printed out by the District Judge, the decree is perfectly clear and I am unable to see that any case has been made out for the extension of the time under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. Section 148 does not seem to apply and, according to Suranjan Singh v. Rambahal Lal [1913] 35 All. 582, it is not meant for preemption suits.

3. I accordingly accept this appeal and, setting aside the decree of the lower Appellate Court, restore the order of the Court of first instance with costs throughout.