1927 Supreme(Lah) 22
Lahore High Court
Broadway, J.
Abdul Ghani - Appellant
Versus
Sansar Chand & Anr. - Respondent
Decided On : 23-11-1927
JUDGMENT
Broadway, J. - This and the connected second appeal arise out of two cases instituted by the sons of one Hukam Chand for a declaration that certain alienations made by their father Hukam Chand would not affect their reversionary rights on his demise. The defendant in one case was Abdul Ghani who had purchased 64 kanals 5 marlas of land from Hukam Chand 'on 9th June 1905 for a sum of Rs. 2,500. In the second case the defendant was one Sardar Ali who had purchased certain property from Hukam Chand for a sum of Rs. 4,700. on 13th January 1917. The learned District Judge recorded one judgment in both cases although the trials were separate and found necessity established for Rs. 1,000 in the case against Abdul Ghani, and in the case against Sardar Ali decreed the plaintiffs' suit in full. Abdul Ghani and Sardar Ali have preferred two separate appeals to this Court and we have heard Mr. Niaz Muhammad on behalf of Abdul Ghani, and Mr. Badri Das on behalf of Sardar Ali, while Mr. Fakir Chand and Chandar Gupat appeared for the plaintiff-respondents.
2. The case of Abdul Ghani need not detain us long. The findings are clear that Hukam Chand and his sons were members of a Joint Hindu family and that the property alienated was ancestral. These are pure findings of fact. Similarly, it was found that no necessity whatever had been proved for Rs. 1,500 out of the Rs. 2,500 alleged to have been paid by the appellant Abdul Ghani. Mr. Niaz Muhammad was constrained to admit that there was no evidence whatever on the record as to necessity qua this sum of Rs. 1,500, and I would, therefore, dismiss this appeal with costs.
3. The matter is not quite so clear in the second appeal, namely, the one by Sardar Ali. The learned District Judge finds that the sum of Rs. 4,700 was made up of four items:
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qua the Rs. 1,900, there is no evidence of necessity whatever and the view taken by the learned District Judge must, therefore, prevail.
4. As to the item payable to Saif-ud-Din the position is this. In 1915, Saif-ud-Din advanced this sum of Rs. 2,500 on a mortgage to Hukam Chand, and in 1917 Sardar Ali was to pay off this item together with any further sum that might be found due for which purpose he retained Rs. 200 of the sale price. As a matter of fact Saif-ud-Din was paid a sum of Rs. 2,631-12-6. The learned District Judge, apparently following Sahu Ram Chandra v. Bhup Singh A.I.R. 1917 P.C. 61, came to the conclusion that although the debt to Saif-ud-Din was "antecedent" it was the duty of the vendee Sardar Ali to establish that the debt for which the mortgage had been executed in 1915 was for necessity. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee considered Sahu Ram Chandra v. Bhup Singh A.I.R. 1917 P.C. 61, in Brij Narain v. Mangal Prasad A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 50, and in order to make the position clear formulated at p. 104 of the report, the propositions which they desired to lay down as a result of their examination of the authorities. It was there held that:
(1) The managing coparcener of a joint undivided estate cannot alienate or burden the estate qua manager except for purposes of necessity:
(2) If he is the father and the reversioners are the sons he may, by incurring debt, so long as it is not for an immoral purpose lay the estate open to be taken in execution proceedings upon a decree for payment of that debt.
(3) If he purports to burden the estate by mortgage, then unless that mortgage is to discharge an antecedent debt, it would not bind the estate and.
(4) Antecedent debt means antecedent in fact as well as in time, that is to say, that the debt must be truly independent and not part of the transaction impeached.
5. Now, the transaction impeached in this litigation is the sale to Sardar Ali, and therefore, the debt paid off by Sardar Ali to Saif-ud-Din was clearly an independent one and, therefore, "antecedent" within the meaning of that expression as used by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee. It was contended, however, that the fa