JUDGMENT

Jai Lal, J. - This is an application under Sections 22, 23 and 151, Civil P.C., made by the defendant Ruchi Ram Khattar for the transfer of the civil suit for the recovery of Rs. 1,08,974-8-3, instituted in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Rawalpindi, to the Dera Ismail Khan District in the North-Western Province. The suit is based on a promissory note admittedly executed by the petitioner in favour of one Sundar Das. Sundar Das, it is alleged, endorsed the promissory note in favour of Sarab Narain Shah, plaintiff. The promissory note was admittedly executed in Dera Ismail Khan, where the petitioner resides, but it is alleged that Sundar Das, who also is a defendant in the suit and is a resident of Rawalpindi, endorsed to Sarab Narain Shah in Rawalpindi. Sarab Narain Shah himself is a resident of the Jhelutn District. He does not carry on any business in Dera Ismail Khan.

2. The application for transfer is made on the ground that there was a dispute between Ruchi Ram and Sundar Das with regard to certain contracts alleged to have been jointly taken by them, which was referred to arbitration. The award of the arbitrator was that Sundar Das should pay Rs. 1,25,000 to Ruchi Ram. An application was therefore made in the Court of the District Judge at Dera Ismail Khan to file the award and it appears that during the pendency of that application Ruchi Ram attempted to attach before judgment the amount due from him to Sundar Das on the basis of the promissory note, but for some reason or other he did not succeed to attach the amount. It is alleged by the petitioner that in order to prevent the attachment of the amount due on the promissory note Sundar Das has fictitiously endorsed the promissory note to Sarab Narain Shah, a relation of his. It is alleged that a good portion of the amount due on the promissory note has been paid by the petitioner and that this will be the main defence in the case. It is, therefore, contended that it will be very inconvenient for the petitioner (the defendant) if the suit is tried in Rawalpindi as he will have to bring his witnesses all the way from Dera Ismail Khan, or it will be necessary to issue commission for their examination as the Court is not competent to procure their attendance in Rawalpindi, a course which, it is intended, will be unsatisfactory. It will thus be observed that the sole ground for the transfer of the suit is the convenience of the defendant.

3. The petition is strenuously opposed both by Sarab Narain Shah and Sundar Das. Sarab Narain Shah, as I have already stated, has no connexion with Dera Ismail Khan and naturally it will be very inconvenient to him if he is made to go to that district to prosecute case.

4. A large number" of judicial authorities were cited by counsel on both sides in support of their respective contentions. I do not propose to discuss them in this judgment as an examination thereof shows that each depended on its particular facts which influenced the learned Judges to transfer or not to transfer the cases before them. The principle, however, is wall established that it is the right of the plaintiff to choose the forum for his action and that in deciding whether the plaintiff should be deprived of that right a very strong case must be made out by the defendant, and further that in deciding whether a suit should or should not be transferred it is not merely the convenience of the defendant that has to be considered, but the plaintiff's convenience also should be borne in mind. Now, in the present case, while it is true that it suits the petitioner (the defendant) that the case should be tried in Dera Ismail Khan where he resides and carries on business, it is equally clear that it will be very inconvenient to the plaintiff if he is ordered to prosecute his suit in the Dera Ismail Khan District. It also appears from the allegation made by the petitioner in the petition for transfer that the right of the plaintiff to maintain the suit is likely to b