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1934 Supreme(Lah) 60

Lahore High Court
J W Oliver - Appellant
Versus
Mian Dost Mohammad - Respondent
Decided On : 02-11-1934

JUDGMENT

1. This his is a petition to revise an order of the District Judge, Amritsar, dismissing the petitioner's application under Section 12, Arbitration Act, for extension of time for filing the award. The relevant facts are that by an agreement dated 24th February 192& the petitioner, J.W. Oliver, and the respondent, Dost Mohammad, referred their disputes, arising out of certain commercial transaction, to the arbitration of two merchants of Amritsar, named, Sheikh Abdur Rahman and Mian I'ahi Bakhsh. In the event of the arbitrators disagreeing, Mr. Milne was to act as umpire. No time was fixed in the reference for making the award. Accordingly under Section 6, Schedule 1, para. (3), Arbitration Act, the arbitrators were bound to deliver their award within three months of the submission, unless time was extended by the Court. The arbitrators appear to have done nothing for about a year and it was not till 4th February 1929, that the petitioner applied to the District Judge under Section 12 praying that the time for filing the award be extended by 15 days.

2. The respondent resisted the application on various grounds, pleading inter alia that the Arbitration Act, was inapplicable and that, in any case, this was not a fit case in which time should be extended. After issues had been framed, one of the arbitrators, Abdul Rahman, died and a further question arose as to whether the Court had the power to appoint another arbitrator in his place. After lengthy proceedings the learned District Judge held that the case was governed by the Arbitration Act, but he dismissed the application as he was of the opinion that the reference had become abortive owing to the death of one of the arbitrators and sufficient cause, had not been shown for extending time.

3. Before us Mr. Mohammad Monir has strenuously argued that the view taken by the learned District Judge, that under Section 8 be had no power to appoint a new arbitrator in place of Abdul Rahman deceased, is incorrect. He has pointed out that Gopalji Kuverji v. Morarji Jeram Naranji 1919 Bom. 24 and Ghani Yacub v. Emperor 1920 Sind 55, on which the learned Judge had relied, had recently been dissented from by the Calcutta High Court in General Electric Trading Co. v. Siemens India 1929 Cal. 177, which laid down the law correctly. We do not however think it necessary for the purposes of this case to go into this question, for we are of opinion that even if Abdur, Rahman were still alive, this is a fit case in which time for making the award should not have been extended under Section 12. As already stated, the submission was made in February 1928, and the award should have been delivered in May of that year. The arbitrators however did nothing in the matter, and neither party took any action till the following February when the present application was made. It appears from the averments in the application that the petitioner himself was to a large extent responsible for this inordinate delay. In the month of May he proceeded to England, and he admits that he himself requested "his arbitrator" not to proceed with the arbitration proceedings until his return. He remained out of India for several months, and even after his return he did not move in the matter for more than three months. His application is very much belated, and in the circumstances was rightly rejected.

4. The Arbitration Act prescribes a procedure for the expeditions and speedy settlement of disputes by private tribunals especially those arising in commerical transactions, and the Legislature has in the schedule fixed a period of three months for the delivery of awards in cases where no time fixed in the reference. The Court has no doubt a discretion to extend time under Section 12, but it will do so only if cogent reasons are forthcoming. Obviously the discretion cannot be exercised in favor of a party who himself has been negligent and as in the present case, has been guilty of dilatory tactics. There is no ground for in

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