JUDGMENT

Agha Haidar, J. - This appeal arises out of a suit on a bahi entry executed by Piran Ditta, defendant 1, in favour of the plaintiff. While Piran Ditta was still a minor, he is alleged to have borrowed Rs. 1,652-1-0 from the plaintiff and executed an entry in the plaintiff's bahi khata for the amount with interest at, the rate of 12 annas per cent per mensem. A sum of Rs. 153-2-0 was paid and eventually on 25th July 1928, defendant 1, executed the entry in suit on the attainment of majority. The plaintiff brought the present suit on the basis of this entry for Rupees 1,930. The main plea raised by defendant 1 with which alone we are concerned, was that the entry was admittedly made without consideration inasmuch as he was a minor at the time of the original transaction on which the entry in suit is based. Both the Courts below have given effect to this plea and: dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The plaintiff has come up to this Court in second appeal. The matter coming up before a Division Bench, the learned Judges, in view of the conflict of authority on the question of law raised in the appeal, have referred the case to a Full Bench.

2. In view of the leading Privy Council case on the subject Mohari Bibi v. Dharmodas (1903) 30 Cal. 539, a contract entered into by a minor is void and unenforceable at law. The term "consideration" is defined in the interpretation clause of the Contract Act, Section 2, Clause (d) as follows:

When at the desire of the promisor, the promisee...has done...something such act is called a consideration for the promise. (Relevant portions only quoted).

Clause (g), Section 2 says:

An agreement not enforceable by law is said to be void.

Under Section 10:

All agreements are contracts if they are made...for a lawful consideration and are not hereby expressly declared to be void.

3. According to Section 11, Contract Act, a person who has not attained the age of majority is not competent to contract. Section 25, Contract Act, lays down that an agreement made without consideration is void unless:

(2) It is a promise to compensate, wholly or in part, a person who has already voluntarily. done something for the promisor, or something which the promisor was legally compellable to do.

4. We are not concerned with Sub-sections 1 and 3 and other provisions of Section 25, Contract Act. We have to construe the provisions of the Contract Act, quoted above, in the light of the Privy Council case of Mohari Bibi v. Dharmodas (1903) 30 Cal. 539. Before proceeding to discuss the case law on the subject, it is necessary to point out that the object of the legislature in enacting the provisions of the Contract Act relating to infants, as explained by their Lordships of the Privy Council, seems to be to make all agreements entered into by minors as of no legal effect whatsoever, and the policy of the law appears to be to protect the minors not only from the wiles of unscrupulous persons who may choose to deal with them, but also against their own actions however generous or honourable they may be. It can be conceded at once that there is nothing to prevent a person from paying money to a money lender from whom he had borrowed it during his minority after he has attained majority. The only point is whether a Court of justice would give effect to and enforce an agreement, entered into by a minor after he had attained majority, whereby he bound himself to repay the advances which had been made to him during the period of his disability by a money lender. The position seems to be that the law has placed an embargo upon all business transactions which may be entered into between an adult and a minor and would not give effect to them at the instance of the adult, even if there has been a subsequent renewal on the part of the minor after the attainment of majority. In other words, the lender would not be allowed to seek the assistance of the Courts for enforcing a contract which he had secured from the minor on his attaining majority,