1935 Supreme(Lah) 64
Lahore High Court
Abdul Rashid, J.
Lal Mohammad & Ors. - Appellants
Versus
(Firm) Khem Chand - Radha Kishan - Respondent
Decided On : 09-12-1935
JUDGMENT
Abdul Rashid, J. - One Abdul Karim died, leaving him surviving three minor sons, namely Lal Muhammad, Muhammad Munir and Gauhar Ali. The firm Khem Chand-Radha Kishan instituted a suit for recovery of Rs. 10,788 against the three minor sons of Abdul Karim on 21st October 1924. On 29th April 1925, the firm Khem Chand-Radha Kishan was granted a decree against the minor sons. The decree-sheet contains the following words:
Digri bazumawari jaidad Abdul Karim mutwaffi ke di jati hai. Muda Alaihim ki zati zumawari nahin hogi.
2. On 26th May 1925, the decree-holders presented an application for execution of their decree by attachment of certain immoveable properties. The judgment-debtors filed objections on 4th July 1925, to the effect that properties marked A, B, C and D were ancestral and could not be attached under the decree. On 6th August it was stated on behalf of the decree-holders that none of the properties were ancestral. The executing Court thereupon framed two issues, one of which was in the following terms:
Whether the houses in dispute were ancestral qua the judgment-debtors, and hence not attachable and saleable in execution of the decree.
3. On 1st February 1927, the counsel for the decree-holders made the following statement:
Main taslim karta hum kih makanat A, B, C one-third D ki teh zamin jaddi hai. Unka malba nilam hona chahiye. Un men siraf madyunan ki rihaish hai. Main yih bhi taslim karta hun ki un men paidawar wagaira bhi rakhte hain.
4. The executing Court held houses, A, B, C and one-third of D to be ancestral and released them from attachment. It also held that these houses were used for residential purposes and for purposes subservient to agriculture, and that they were not liable to attachment and sale on that ground also. Properties E, F, G and H were held to be self-acquired properties of Abdul Karim, and were therefore sold in execution of the decree. Both the decree-holders and the judgment-debtors appealed to this Court. Both of these appeals were however dismissed. On 1st November 1932, the decree-holders presented another application for the execution of their decree, and this has given rise to the present appeal. They sought execution of their decree by bringing to sale the land in dispute which is admittedly the ancestral property of Abdul Karim. It was stated that there was a special custom in the Ferozepore District whereby ancestral property in the hands of the sons of the debtor was liable for the debts of their father, and that Jagdip Singh v. Naraya Singh (1913) 4 PR 1913 was therefore not applicable to the present case. The executing Court has held that it has been established that there is a special custom in the Ferozepore District which makes ancestral property in the hands of the sons of the debtor liable to attachment and sale in execution of a simple money decree against their deceased father. The judgment-debtors have come up in appeal to this Court. The lower Court has based its judgment mainly on the Answer to Question 32 in the Customary law of the Ferozepore District which runs in the following terms:
Question No. 32: Is a minor whose father is dead and who has inherited the father's estate liable for the father's debt ? If such debts are not payable till the minor comes of age, can the property inherited be alienated in the interval?
Answer: All tribes admit that the minor is liable. His liability is of course limited to the estate he inherits.
5. This identical question occurs in the Customary law of Shahpur District also. It was held by a Division Bench of this Court in Civil Appeal No. 24 of 1935 Narain Singh v. Malik Ahmad Yar Khan 1936 Lah 21, that all that the answer to question No. 32 means is that the guardian of a minor can, just as the minor can when he attains majority, pay his father's debts and sell the ancestral land which came to him through his father in order to do so. This answer does not imply that he succeeds his father as his legal representative. It merely