JUDGMENT

Tek Chand, J. - This appeal arises of a suit instituted by Mt. Fatima Bibi, plaintiff, against her husband Lal Din and one Nizam Din for recovery of Rs. 1,000 on account of dower. The suit has been decreed by the Courts below against Lal Din but has been dismissed against Nizam Din. The plaintiff appeals urging that the claim should have been decreed against Nizam Din also. Both counsel admit before me that the marriage of the plaintiff with Lal Din took place on the 27th August 1932. On the same day a document (Ex. p./1) was executed by Lal Din as principal, and Nizam Din as surety, reciting that a sum of Rs. 1,000 had been fixed as dower, that Lal Din was liable to pay it and that if he failed to do so, Nizam Din, surety, would pay the same and that his moveable and immovable property as well as his person would be liable. The Courts below have found that this deed was executed some time after the marriage and, there, fore, it was without consideration. After hearing counsel for the respondent I find myself unable to agree with this conclusion. Assuming that the amount of dower was fixed subsequent to the marriage and that Nizam Din guaranteed the payment of the amount by the husband to the wife, I do not see why he is not liable. Under Mahomedan law it is not necessary that dower should be agreed upon before marriage; it may be fixed afterwards: see Kamar-un-nissa Bibi v. Hussani Bibi (1881) 3 All 266 (P C) at p. 274. It is also well settled that where a certain sum is fixed at the time of the marriage, it may be increased afterwards, or it may be subsequently remitted by the wife. If, therefore, a post-nuptial agreement fixing or increasing, the dower is binding on the husband, there seems no reason why it should not be binding on the person who guaranteed its payment. The learned Counsel for the respondent has referred me to the remarks in certain judgments that "dower is the consideration for the marriage", but it is clear that the word "consideration" in these remarks is not to be taken to have been used in the technical sense in which the word is used in the Indian Contract Act. As observed by Sir Abdur Rahim in his Mahomedan Jurisprudence (p. 334):

Under Muhammadan law a marriage is valid though dower is not settled at the time, and it is wrong to say that dower is a 'consideration' proceeding from the husband for the contract of marriage. In reality it is an obligation imposed by Mahomadan Law as a mark of respect for the wife.

2. In Bailie's Digeat (Vol. 1, p. 91) it is stated that:

Dower is not the exchange or consideration given by the man to woman for entering into the contract, but an effect of the contract, imposed by the law on the husband as a token of respect for its subject, the woman.

3. Similarly in the Hedaya (Vol. 1, Book 2, Chapter 3) it is laid down that:

Marriage is valid although no dower has been mentioned because literally nikah signifies a contract of union which is fully accomplished by the performance of the marital rites. Dower is obligatory as a mark of respect for the subject (al-mahal); therefore its mention is not essential to the validity of the marriage. For the like reason, a marriage is valid, although the man were to engage in the contract on the special condition that there should be no dower.

4. There is, therefore, no force in the contention of the respondent's learned Counsel. The post-nuptial agreement by Lall Din to pay to his wife Eg. 1,000 as dower was perfectly legal; and the agreement by Nizam Din guaranteeing this payment is not void as being without consideration, as erroneously held by the lower Court. There is no valid reason, therefore, why he should escape liability under it. I accept the appeal and, in modification of the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge, pass a decree for the amount claimed against Nizam Din also with costs throughout.