JUDGMENT

Bhide, J. - The material facts of the case giving rise to this second appeal may be briefly stated as follows: Mt. Jan, a young girl, on being married, executed a power-of-attorney in favour of her stepmother Mt. Fajjan on 6th April 1929. By this document Mt. Fajjan was authorized to manage the land of Mt. Jan, to realize rents and also to sell and mortgage the property. The relations between the two ladies apparently became strained later on and on 25th May 1934 Mt. Jan executed another document revoking the power-of-attorney and got it registered. A notice of the revocation was sent by registered post to Mt. Fajjan on 16th June 1934 but the notice was not accepted by Mt. Fajjan and was returned to Mt. Jan. Mt. Jan also sent an application to the Tehsildar on 18th June 1934 informing him of the revocation of the power-of-attorney. The revocation was also notified by beat of drum in the village. In spite of these facts, Mt. Fajjan sold the whole of the property belonging to Mt. Jan to Abdul Aziz, defendant 2, her nephew, on 8th November 1934. Thereupon Mt. Jan instituted the present suit for a declaration that the sale should not affect her rights. The defendants resisted the suit pleading that Mt. Fajjan had authority to sell the property, that the power-of-attorney had never been revoked and that the revocation had at any rate never been brought to the notice of Mt. Fajjan or the vendee Abdul Aziz. The trial Court found the issues in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit.

2. On appeal by the defendant Abdul Aziz two main' contentions were raised before the learned District Judge on behalf of Mt. Jan, viz.(1) that the sale was made after cancellation of the power of attorney of which cancellation both the defendants had knowledge, and (2) that the power-of-attorney conferred no right to sell the property. The learned Judge held on the first point that the revocation was not proved to have been brought to the notice of either of the defendants. On the second point he was of opinion that in view of the provisions of Section 237, Contract Act the plaintiff was bound by the acts of Mt. Fajjan, which fell within the scope of her authority. It seems to me that the second point is really; the most important one in the case. The learned Counsel for the appellant has contended that' the power-of-attorney was really given to Mt. Fajjan for management of the property of the plaintiff as she was married and was not in a position to look after the land. The power to sell and mortgage was no doubt mentioned in the document but it was purely incidental to the power of management and was not meant to be exercised except when it was necessary for that purpose. Counsel relied in this respect on the law as laid down in Article 34 in Bowstead on Agency, Edition 8, which runs as follows:

Powers-of-attorney must be strictly pursued and are construed as giving only such authority as they confer expressly or by necessary implication. The following are the most important rules of construction (1) The operative part of the deed is controlled by the recitals. (2) Where authority is given to do particular acts, followed by general words, the general words are restricted to what is necessary for the proper performance of the particular acts.

3. Bearing in mind the above principles, the recitals in the power-of-attorney leave, I think, no doubt that the main object of the plaintiff was to entrust the management of the land to Mt. Fajjan, as she was married and was no longer in a position to manage it. It was obviously not the intention then to sell the property. If this had been so, the land would have been sold soon after the power-of-attorney had been executed. Mt. Fajjan has not given any explanation as to why the land was sold in the year 1934, some five years after the execution of the power-of-attorney. It is not suggested that there was any difficulty in connexion with the management of the property, which necessitated the sale. The sal