JUDGMENT

Munir, Ag C J - The question to which an answer has to be returned by this Full Bench is whether in a suit properly falling under Section 7(iv)(e), Court-fees Act, where the plaintiff has stated in the plaint a particular value for purposes of court-fee and a different value for purposes of jurisdiction, it is the former that determines the latter under Section 8, Suits Valuation Act or vice versa. The reference to the Full Bench was necessitated by the considered obiter dictum in Mst. Zeb-ul-Nisa v. Chaudhri Din Muhammad A.I.R. (28) 1941 Lah. 97, and the decision in several other cases of this Court that where a relief framed in a declaratory form is held by the Court to be a relief for declaration with consequential relief falling under Section 7(iv)(c), Court-fees Act and a particular value for purposes 'of jurisdiction is mentioned in the plaint, the plaintiff by reason of Section 8, Suits Valuation Act, is bound to adopt that value for purposes of court-fee. Section 8, Suits Valuation Act, on the construction of which the answer to the question depends, is as follows:

Where in suits other than those referred to in the Court-fees "Act, 1870, Section 7, paragraphs v, vi, and ix and paragraph x, Clause (d), court-fees are payatle ad valorem under the Court-fees Act, 1870, the value as determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value of jurisdiction shall be the same.

2. It is quite obvious from the terms of this section that in suits to which the section is applicable it is the value as determinable for the computation of court-fees that determines the value for purposes of jurisdiction. Suits falling under Section 7(iv)(c), Court-fees Act not being included in the exceptions mentioned in Section 8, Suits Valuation Act, they are governed by the general rule enacted by the section to the effect that in the case of suits not specifically mentioned in the section the value for purposes of court-fee determines the value for purposes of jurisdiction. The Court-fees Act was passed in 1870 while the Suits Valuation Act was enacted 17 years later, and it must be remembered that the object of Section 8, Suits Valuation Act, is to fix the value of suits for purposes of jurisdiction and not for purposes of court-fee. In fact the section assumes that the value for purposes of court-fee has been determined or is determinable and it is the value so determined or determinable that determines the value for purposes of jurisdiction. The section has received this construction in a large number of cases including the Privy Council decision in Sunderabai v. The Collector of Belgaum A.I.R. 1918 P.C. 135 where the question was whe-ther the forum of appeal in suits falling under Section 7(iv)(c), Court-fees Act, is determined by the value of the subject-matter or by the value put by the plaintiff on the relief under Section 7(iv)(c), Court-fees Act. The appeal in. that case had originally been filed in the High Court under the mistaken belief that it is the value of the subject-matter for purposes of jurisdiction that determines the course of appeal in such eases but the High Court held that the forum of appeal is determined in this class of cases by the value for purposes of court-fee under Section 7(iv)(c), Court-fees Act. Referring to the view taken by the High Court the Privy Council observed:

On objection taken on behalf of the defendants, the High Court on 11th March 1912, rightly decided that the appeal lay to the Court of the District Judge of Belgaum and not to the High Court, and affirmed a principle, which bad been previously applied by the High Court at Bombay, that

Where a plaintiff sues for a declaratory decree and asks for consequential relief, and puts his own valuation upon that consequential relief, then for the purposes of court-fee, and also for the purposes of jurisdiction, it is the value that the plaintifl puts upon the plaint that determines both.

The same view of Section 8, Suits Valuation Act, has been take