JUDGMENT

Gwyer C.J.

1. I have had the opportunity of reading the judgment prepared by my brother Varadachariar and I find myself so completely in agreement with it that I think it unnecessary to deliver a separate judgment of my own. I will only add, since the question of jurisdiction has been mentioned, that I have no doubt that this Court has jurisdiction in criminal as well as civil cases. It would indeed be very surprising if it were otherwise, since it has been in the Criminal Courts that many of the great constitutional questions of the past have been determined; and in my opinion the words "judgment, decree or final order" ought to receive no narrow interpretation. I concur with my brethren in holding that the appeal should be allowed as regards the charge under Section 477-A, I.P.C.and dismissed as regards the charge under Section 409.

Sulaiman J.

2. The facts of this case are fully given in the judgment to be delivered by brother Varadachariar, although no objection had been raised by learned counsel to the maintainability of this appeal, I had expressed a doubt regarding it in the course of the hearing. The question being one of jurisdiction, I feel that I should not ignore it.

Criminal Jurisdiction.

3. The first question is whether a criminal appeal at all lies to the Federal Court. The mere fact that the Federal Court has framed rules for such appeals is not by itself conclusive. The doubt is created by the observations made by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the somewhat analogous case in Chung Chuok v. The King (1930) 17 A I R P C 291 In that case the decision turned on the interpretation of Rule 2 of the Order in Council dated 23rd January 1911. Under that Rule an appeal lay as of right from any final judgment of the Court, and at the discretion of the Court from any other judgment Rule 1 defined 'judgment' as including "decree, order, sentence or decision." Their Lordships pointed out that although the word 'sentence' is appropriate to some procedure in criminal law and is chiefly heard in criminal trials, there is a groat difference between a conviction and a sentence and it would be very strange if there were appeal against sentence and not against conviction; the word 'sentence' is a well known word in common law and it is not applied so as to give the right to appeal in criminal cases. The word 'decision' if it stood alone may embrace matters of both civil and criminal laws but the word is not used alone herR. One cannot take one word out of this Order and say that it may include criminal law; one must look at the whole of the Order in Council. Now Rule 2 (a) certainly referred to civil matters and for purposes of an appeal fixed a value for the subject matter of the suit, and Rule 2(b) began with the words "subject to the pro. visions of these Rules. "Their Lordships thought that the word "other "refers and relates back to the same sort of judgments as those which are referred to in Rule 2(a), that is to say a judgment where the matter in dispute amounts to or involves some claim to property. Other provisions of the order related to subject matters and did not appear to include criminal matters. In particular, there was provision for "stay of execution" which was entirely appropriate in a civil case and was not so appropriate in a criminal case; nor was there any provision made for a man who had been sent to prison. Their Lordships accordingly held that the words were not wide enough to include a criminal judgment.

4. Some of these considerations are applicable to the provisions of the Government of India Act as well. Section 205(1) refers to an appeal from "any judgment, decree or final order." It does not even use the word "decision" much less "sentence ". Judgment, decree or final order taken together are words commonly used in the Code of Civil Procedure where judgment is followed by a decree or final order. The words ' final order "are still more appropriate in a civil case where a clear distinction