JUDGMENT

Srinivasa Varadachariar, J. - This appeal arises out of proceedings taken by the Respondent to challenge the validity of an octroi duty on salt imposed by the municipal adminis-tration of Lahore. Under Section 61(2) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 Punjab Act No. 11l of 19011., the municipal administration is empowered, with the previous sanction of the Provincial Government, to impose any "tax which the Provincial Legislature has power to impose in the Province under the Government of India Act, 1935". In April, 1938, the Appellant who, under Section 238 of the Municipal Act, had been exercising the powers of the superseded Municipality of Lahore published a notification imposing octroi duties at varying rates on goods imported into Lahore, and salt was one of the commodities specified in the schedule under the heading "articles of food and drink In October 1939, the Respondent brought two maunds of salt into the municipal limits and, with the evident object of making it a test case, he paid the duty under protest and later applied for refund of the amount. When the matter was taken on appeal to the Deputy Commissioner, under Section 84 of the Punjab Municipal Act, he referred to the High Court the question whether the notification above referred to was authorized by law so far as it related to the impost on salt. The learned Judge who heard the reference held that in imposing a tax on salt the Appellant had transgressed the limits of his authority under the law. The Appellant now appeals to this Court.

2. On behalf of the Respondent, a preliminary objection was taken to the form of the appeal. It was contended that only a party to the proceedings in the court below could appeal to this Court and that the Municipal Committee, and not the Administrator, was the party in the High Court. It was also urged that as the Municipal Committee had been constituted by Section 18 of the Municipal Act a body corporate with perpetual succession, its supersession did not put an end to the corporation and that all legal proceedings by or against the corporation must, as provided in that section, be instituted only in the name of the corporation. These objections seem to us devoid of substance. The proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner and the reference by him to the High Court were not framed on the lines of formal pleadings; but taking them as a whole it would appear that it was the Administrator who was treated therein as the opposite party though in the title of the judgment of the High Court the "Municipal Committee, Lahore" is described as the Respondent. The provisions of Section 18 of the Punjab Municipal Act relating to the corporate character of the Committee and the manner of suing must be read subject to the provisions of Section 238(2) which lays down the consequences of a supersession. It may be (as held in Mahamahopadyaya Rangachariar v. The Municipal Council of Kumbakonam I.L.R. [1906] Mad. 539, that a supersession has not the effects of a dissolution and that when another Committee is constituted in the place of the superseded Committee, it is a revival of the old corporation and not the creation of a new one. But during the period when the order of supersession is in force, the statute makes it clear that all the members of the Committee vacate their seats and that all the powers and duties of the Committee are to be exercised and performed by the Administrator. It seems to us that we should be carrying the legal fiction to a needless length if we insisted that, even in this state of facts, proceedings must be taken only in the name of the dormant corporation. It has not been disputed that the person competent to take proceedings is the Administrator; and even if the true view should be that he should take proceedings in the name of the Committee, the defect is one purely of a formal character which can be cured by amendment.

3. The decision of the question of law arising in the case turns on the combined effect