JUDGMENT

1. This is an appeal from an order of the Fourth Additional Judge of Lucknow in insolvency proceedings. The insolvent, R.J. De Cruze, resigned his position as an employee in the Oudh and Rohilkhund Railway. A sum of Rs. 4,800 standing to hi} credit in the provident fund was then returned to him. He had at an earlier date been made an insolvent, but had not been discharged. A creditor, the appellant, asked (no Receiver having been appointed) to be allowed to attach this sum. The lower Court, relying on the case of Nagindas Bhukandas v. Ghelabhai Gulabdas, [1920] 44 Bom.673, upheld this contention; The question in this appeal is whether the lower Court was right in doing so.

2. The decision relied upon appears to us to be on all fours with the present case, but we regret that we are not disposed to follow it. It was admitted in the judgment; of the Bombay Court that, under Section 16(4) of the Provincial Insolvency Act 3 of 1907, which is identical with Section 28(4) of the present Act, 5 of 1920, all property acquired by an insolvent after the date of adjudication and before his discharge, shall forthwith vest in the Court or Receiver, and it was remarked that, at first sight, it would appear that these words in their literal construction are free from any doubt. But the Bombay High Court refused to adopt a literal construction on two grounds. The first ground was that in the English case Cohen v. Mitchell, [1890] 25 Q.B.D.262 the English Court had declined to follow the literal construction of Sections 44 and 54 of the English Bankruptcy Act on the ground of inconvenience and the Bombay High Court pointed out, that in a previous case decided by the Bombay High Court Alimahamad v. Vadilal Devchand, [1919] 43 Bom.890, the Court had allowed itself the same measure of freedom. It suffices to say that the earlier Bombay casa was distinguishable both from the later Bombay case and from the present case, inasmuch as in that case the insolvent had transferred property in good faith acquired by him after the adjudication order to: a third party for value. It was not pleaded in this case that the provident fund money had passed out of the control of the insolvent. In the later Bombay case, however, it has been held, that neither the Official Assignee nor the Official Receiver (and similarly the Court) has any claim to money drawn by an insolvent as his provident fund from a Railway Company. The English ruling Cohen v. Mitchell, [1890] 25 Q.B.D.262, and the decision in Nagindas Bhukandas v. Ghelabhai Gulabdas, [1920] 44 Bom.673, were based on other considerations. It invoked Section 4 of the Provident Funds Act, 1897, which is still in force. This section provides that neither the Official Assignee nor Receiver, appointed under Ch. 20 of the Civil P.C., shall be entitled to or have any claim on a compulsory deposit. The present Section 57 of the Provincial Insolvency Act 5 of 1920, takes the place of Section 351 of the Civil P.C. of 1882 as regards the appointment of Receivers. The Bombay High Court expressed the opinion that the words

shall be entitled to or have any claim on any such compulsory deposit

would bar a claim to a compulsory deposit, even after it had been paid over to the insolvent. In so doing we consider that the Bombay High Court ignored the definition of "compulsory deposit" contained in Section 2(4) of the Provident Funds Act, 9 of 1897. The definition runs as follows;

'Compulsory deposit' means a subscription or deposit which is not repayable on demand, or at the option of the subscriber or depositor, etc

3. In our opinion the words "repayable on demand" clearly show that a compulsory deposit is only a deposit so long as it remains in the fund, and not after it has been paid over to the person to whose credit it had hitherto stood.

4. The respondent's counsel invoked Sub-section (5) of Section 28 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 5 of 1920. This provision excludes from attachment of property which is exempted