JUDGMENT

Gokaran Nath, A J C - This is an application for revision of the order of Babu Shankar Dayal, First Additional Sessions Judge of Bara Banki, dated the 16th March 1925, upholding the order of M. Azimuddim Khan, a Magistrate of the First Class of Bara Banki, dated the 2nd February 1925. Both the Courts below have held that the applicant is a fit person to be called upon to furnish security to be of good behaviour for a period of one year under Section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

2. The case for the prosecution is that the applicant is a man of bad character, that he associates with such men as were registered members of criminal tribes and ex-convicts and that he is so desperate and dangerous as to render his being at large without security hazardous to the community. His defence was that he bore good character and that the case had been brought against him by the Sub-Inspector at the instigation of the taluqdars of Surajpur and Daryabad, district Bara Banki, who were inimically disposed towards him and who had induced the police to start the case against him. Both the Courts below have found the prosecution case to be established and have not believed the defence witnesses. In revision it is contended before me that they have arrived at a wrong conclusion.

3. The case was very badly argued before me by Mr. M.A. Khar, who appeared on behalf of the applicant, and I bad to spend a good deal of my time to go through the record and to find out as to whether the decision of the lower Courts was a correct one. He argued as if I was sitting as a Court of appeal against the decision of the learned Additional Sessions Judge. This I refused to submit to. In Miharban Singh v. Emperor [1915] 13 A.L.J. 1046 Richards, C.J., laid down the principle which was to be followed by a High Court in deciding such cases. He held that the High Court was not a Court of appeal in cases under Section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the duty of the High Court was not to weigh the evidence given on behalf of one side or the other, but only to see whether the Court below had approached the consideration of the case in a fair way, having regard to the interest not only of the prosecution but also of the accused. The same principle was laid by Daniels, J.C., in this Court in Gur Din v. King-Emperor A.I.R. 1921 Oudh 115. The above-mentioned ruling of the Allahabad High Court was quoted with approval and it was further laid down that the accused was not entitled to an acquittal in such cases because the defence witnesses were as numerous as or more numerous than the prosecution witnesses and that it was the weight of the evidence and not the number of the witnesses which the Court had to consider. In dealing with the present case I would approach it according to the view laid down in the above-mentioned cases.

4. The prosecution evidence has been discussed in great detail and with extreme care by the learned Sessions Judge and the learned Counsel only vaguely pointed out to me that much of that evidence was inadmissible. He did not refer to those portions of the evidence for the prosecution which in his opinion wore inadmissible. He merely urged in a general way, that the evidence as to "general repute" as given on behalf of the prosecution was inadmissible. The rule of law to be followed in such cases was laid down so far back as in the case of Dunia Singh v. King-Emperor [1902] 5 O.C. 208. Spankie, A.J.C., has discussed the question of the evidence of general repute at pages 209 and 210 of the said report. "Evidence of general repute," observes the learned Judge, "means, with reference to a man's character, evidence as to his general character founded on the general opinion of the neighbourhood in which he lives. Evidence as to his general disposition, founded on the opinion of the particular witness, such opinion being the result of the witness's personal experience and observation, will also be evidence as to his character. But,