JUDGMENT

1. This is the plaintiff's appeal from the decree of the Subordinate Judge of Fyzabad dated 24th August 1931, affirming the decree of the Munsif of the same place dated 30th March 1931. In the suit out of which this appeal arises, the plaintiff seeks to obtain a decree for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 564 against the defendant on the ground that on 3rd July 1927 the defendant borrowed a sum of Rs. 531 from the plaintiff and executed a pronote and a receipt therefor on the same date in favour of the plaintiff and that again on 10th June 1930, the defendant executed a receipt for the old loan of Rs. 531 and thereby promised to repay it with interest at the rate of Rs. 12-8-0 per cent per annum. It was also stated in the plaint of the suit that on the date of the receipt just now mentioned the defendant also executed a pro-note for the sum of Rs. 531 but for the reason that the pro-note is inadmissible in evidence the claim was founded on the original debt of 23rd July 1927, and the receipt of 10th June 1930 being an acknowledgment saved the suit from the bar of limitation. At the trial only two-documents were admitted in evidence in proof of the plaintiff's claim, Ex. 3, dated 3rd July 1927 and Ex. 2, dated 10th June 1930. Both these documents evidence the receipt of the consideration of the contract of loan.

2. The Courts below have dismissed the plaintiff's suit as barred by limitation. They have held that the receipt of 10th June 1930: Ex. 2 did not amount to acknowledgment within the meaning of Section 19, Lim. Act, 1908. The alternative case of the plaintiff that the receipt evidences a fresh contract of loan was rejected by the lower appellate Court on the ground that that case was not set up in the plaint. The Court of first instance has found that the plaintiff did as a matter of fact advance the sum of Rs. 531 to the defendant on 3rd July 1927 by way of a loan and the finding has been accepted by the lower appellate Court. It is clear that on this finding the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for the recovery of the sum of Rs. 531 if his suit is not barred by limitation. We are of opinion that the receipt of 10th June 1930, Ex.-2, is a sufficient ac-nowledgment of the defendant's liability to repay the loan of 3rd July 1927. It clearly recites the receipt of Rs. 531 by the defendant and it is agreed that on the date of Ex. 2, that is 10th June 1930, nothing was paid by the plaintiff to the defendant. Therefore the language of the receipt is on the face of it unmeaning in reference to existing facts. In these circumstances extrinsic evidence is permissible to show the true meaning of the language used in the receipt under the provisions of Section 95, Evidence Act, 1872. In Balkishen Das v. Legge, (1900) 22 All 149, Lord Davey, in delivering the judgment of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee said:

Their Lordships do not think that oral evidence of intention was admissible for the purpose of construing deeds or ascertaining the intention of the parties ...... The case must therefore be decided on a consideration of the contents of the documents themselves, with such extrinsic evidence of surrouuding circumstances as may be required to show in what manner the language of the document is related to existing facts.

3. The question as to whether a document does or does not contain an acknowledgment is always in our opinion a question of interpretation and rules of evidence applicable to such a question must therefore apply to such a document also. This is clear from the decisions of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Sukhmani Chowdhrani v. Ishan Chander Roy, (1898) 25 Cal 844 and Maniram v. Seth Rupchand, (1906) 38 Cal 1047. In Aizaz Husain v. Ram Sarup, AIR 1931 Oudh 54, decided by us we held that parol evidence was permissible to show that the name of A was written by mistake for that of B in the document produced in proof of acknowledgment in that case. On these grounds we must hold that the acknow