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1932 Supreme(Oudh) 66

HIGH COURT OF OUDH
Nanavutty, J.
B Daya Shankar Vakil - Appellant
Versus
Mohammad Ibrahim Khan - Respondent
Decided On : 05-12-1932

JUDGMENT

Nanavutty, J - This is an office report regarding deficiency of court-fee. The plaintiff instituted a suit for a declaration that the registered deed executed by defendants 2 and 3 in favour of defendant 1 was null and void and that it did not affect the property hypothecated thereunder. The ground set up in the plaint was that the property in question had been bequeathed by the last owner in favour of a patshala and was in possession of the plaintiff as executor. A court-fee of Rs. 10 only was paid on the plaint and the same court-fee was paid on the memorandum of appeal filed in the lower appellate Court as well as on the memorandum of appeal filed in this Court. The objection raised by the office is that as under Section 39, Specific Relief Act. a copy of the Court's order in the event of success of the plaintiff's claim will have to be sent to the registering authority for cancellation of the instrument, therefore the declatation sought for by the plaintiff implies a substantial and consequential relief. We do not find ourselves able to accept this report as correct. The case is fully covered by the principles Lald down by a Bench of this Court in Kuber Saran v. Raghubar, AIR 1929 Oudh 491.

2. It was observed in this case that certain cases falling under Section 39, Specific Refief Act, are simple declaratory suits and others are declaratory suits in which consequential relief is desired; while in cases where a declaration alone is sought a stamp of Rs. 10 is sufficient; in other cases under Section 39, Act 1 of 1877, in which not only is a declaration sought, but it is further asked that the document shall be delivered up, cancelled, and its registration set aside, an ad valorem court-fee must be paid under the provisions of Section 7, Clause (4), Sub-clause (c), Court-fees Act 7 of 1870. In the present case there is no prayer made for the document being delivered up, cancelled and its registration set aside. In fact no such prayer was possible because the plaintiff was no party to the deed. We have no doubt that the suit is a simple declaratory suit which does not involve any consequential relief. We are therefore of opinion that the court-fee paid on the plaint and on the memorandum of appeals in this Court as well as in the lower appellate Court is correct.

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