JUDGMENT

Nanavutty, J - This is an execution of decree appeal against an appellate judgment and decree of the District Judge of Fyzabad dated 21st January 1932 upholding the order of the Subordinate Judge of Fyzabad dated 21st March 1931 dismissing the objection of the judgment-debtor. The facts out of which this second appeal has arisen are as follows: The decree sought to be executed was passed on 25th September 1924. The first application for execution of the decree was made on 7th December 1925. The second application for execution of the decree was made on 7th April 1926. The third application for execution of the decree was made on 12th March 1929 and the fourth and last application was made on 22nd August 1930. It will thus be seen that the first application for execution of the decree was made about 15 months after the passing of the decree and each second application for execution was made within three years after the date of the one immediately preceding it. In this way the last application for execution of the decree is clearly within time. On behalf of the judgment-debtor it has been strenuously argued that the second and third applications referred to above were not applications made for execution of the decree. They were merely applications for the transfer of the decree from one Court to another and as such they do not save limitation. In support of this contention the learned Counsel for the judgment-debtor appellant relied upon a ruling of the Allahabad High Court reported in Mt. Begam Sultan v. Sarvi Begam, AIR1926All93 and in Rajendra Lal Sha v. Abdul Karim, (A.I.R. 1923 Cal. 572). These rulings to my mind do not really support the proposition propounded by the learned Counsel for the judgment-debtor. In my opinion the rulings cited by the. learned Counsel for the respondent are far more appropriate to the facts and circumstances of the present case than those relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant. In Todar Mal v. Phola Kunwar, (1913) 35 All 389 it was held by a Bench of the Allahabad High Court that an application made to the Court passing a decree to transfer it for execution to another Court was an application to take a step-in-aid of execution within the meaning of Article 182, Schedule 1, Lim. Act, 1908. To the same effect and in very clear language is a ruling of the Patna High Court reported in Ram Chandra v. Krishna Lal, AIR 1922 Pat 301. The learned Chief Justice of the Patna High Court, Sir Dawson Miller, in this case delivered himself of the following expression of opinion:

The first point made by the appellant whose objection was not allowed either by the Munsif or the District Judge or by the Judge of this Court is that the application made on 1st May 1914, and again in 1916, were not steps taken in aid of execution and were not in themselves applications for execution within the meaning of Article 182, Lim. Act. We are not concerned to inquire whether applications of the nature referred to were applications in execution. The better view appears to be that they are not. I have no doubt whatever however that such an application is a step-in-aid of execution and it is a step which is always necessary where the decree-holder desires to obtain execution against property situate outside the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the Court which made the decree. In fact there are certain decisions to the effect that such an application is a step-in-aid of execution whereas the learned vakil for the appellant has been unable to put before us any case in which the contrary view has been expressed. I should have thought myself that there could be no question upon this point.

2. I am in entire agreement with the view of the law propounded by the learned Chief Justice of the Patna High Court. The Court of the late Judicial Commissioner of Oudh in Ejaz Husain v. Shahzaman Mirza, (1913) 16 OC 70 also held that an application to have a decree tranaferred for execution to another Court was an