SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Article Pause Article
judgment-img

1939 Supreme(Oudh) 25

HIGH COURT OF OUDH
Ziaul Hasan, J.
B Chandraj Bahadur - Appellant
Versus
Baba Din - Respondent
Decided On : 20-12-1939

JUDGMENT

Ziaul Hasan, J - This is a miscellaneous appeal against an order of the learned Special Judge, first grade, Bara Banki, by the applicant under Section 4 Encumbered Estates Act. Chandraj Bahadur, the present applicant applied under Section 4, Encumbered Estates Act, to the Collector on 23rd December 1935 and an order under Section 6 was passed by the Collector on 6th January 1936. In his application he showed an eight annas share of village Keolapur as one of the items of property belonging to him. The respondents Baba Din, Nageshwar Prasad and Tirbhawan Dat, had obtained a decree for rent of an exproprietary tenancy against Chandraj Bahadur and had put up the latter's eight annas share of village Keciapur for sale in execution of their decree for rent. On 19th February 1936, Chandraj Bahadur applied for stay of the sale under Section 7, Encumbered Estates Act, and this application was granted. Subsequently the Local Government issued an order (No. 642 dated 9th April, 1936) declaring that execution decrees passed against tenants in favour of landlords were, not to be stayed under Section 7, Encumbered Estates Act. Thereupon the decree-holders applied for sale in execution of their decree being proceeded with. The result was that the judgment-debtor's equity of redemption in the eight annas share in question (for that was what was left to him in the property) was sold and purchased by the decree-holders themselves. By virtue of this purchase the present respondents brought a claim under Section 11, Encumbered Estates Act, alleging that the eight annas share did not belong to the applicant under Section 4 but belonged to them. The learned Special Judge upheld the claim holding that the interpretation of Section 7, Encumbered Estates Act, contained in the Government Order referred to above was correct and that Section 7 did not apply to proceedings in execution of rent decrees 'and that therefore the sale of the share in question was binding upon the applicant under Section 4 (the present appellant). In this appeal the appellant challenges this order of the learned Special Judge. I am of opinion that this appeal must succeed. The material portion of Section 7 runs as follows:

7. (1) When the Collector has passed an order under Section 6 the following consequences shall ensue: (a) all proceedings pending at the date of the said order in any Civil or Revenue Court in the United Provinces in respect of any public or private debt to which the landlord is subject, or with which his immovable property is encumbered except an appeal or revision against a decree or order, shall be stayed, all attachments and other execution processes issued by any such Court and then in force in respect of any such debt shall become null and void, and no fresh process in execution, shall, except as hereinafter provided, be issued.

2. It is clear that under Clause (a) of Section 7(1) above, all proceedings pending at the date of the Collector's order under Section 6 in any Civil or Revenue Court in respect of any public or private debt to which the applicant under Section 4 is subject must be stayed. Clause (b), which relates to fresh suits and proceedings, no doubt makes an exception in the case of a process for ejectment for arrears of rent, but in the present case no proceedings were taken by the decree-holders for ejectment so that the exception mentioned in Clause (b) does not apply. The learned Counsel for the respondents argues that from the use of the word "landlord" in Clause (a) it appears that only those proceedings which relate to any debt owing by the applicant under Section 4 as landlord are to be stayed and not those which relate to any debt which he is liable for as a tenant. I am unable to accept this argument or to read any such distinction in Section 7. "Landlord" is defined in Section 2(g) as a proprietor of a mohal or of a share of or interest in a mohal and it cannot be and is not denied that the present appellant is a landl

Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
whatsapp-icon Back to top