JUDGMENT

1. These are applications for revision under Section 115, Civil P.C., against an order of the learned District Judge of Unao, dated 6th August 1936, awarding rateable distribution of assets under Section 73, Civil P.C. The facts leading up to the present applications are as follows: Jairam Das, father of Shanti Lal opposite party No. 19 in Application No. 153, obtained a decree for profits of a sugar mill against Jagannath Prasad and Nihal Chand from the Court of the Civil Judge of Unao on 28th March 1933. In 1934 his son Shanti Lal sued the same persons for profits of the mill relating to subsequent years. This suit was referred to certain arbitrators residing in the Punjab who were given authority to go behind the previous decree obtained by Jai Ram Das and to decide the disputes between the parties afresh. On 4th December 1935, the arbitrators delivered their award holding that if the defendants deposit to the credit of Shanti Lal a sum of Rs. 49,166 in Court on or before 15th January 1936, they would be relieved of interest and costs of Shanti Lal. This amount was tendered to the Court of the Civil Judge, Unao, on 15th January 1936, but as on that date the learned Civil Judge was on leave, the money was deposited in the Court of the District Judge. On the same date the award of the arbitrators was made a rule of Court.

2. It appears that Jairam Das was indebted to various persons under decrees and orders of different Courts. One of his creditors was the Lyallpur Bank Ltd. (in liquidation), applicant in Application No. 153 of 1936, and another was Ramji Das, applicant in Application No. 191, who is now dead and is represented by Dwarka Das and four others. The other creditors to whom rateable assets were awarded by the learned District Judge, are opposite parties in the applications before us. As one of the creditors of Jairam Das was the Secretary of State for India in Council, the learned District Judge held that his debt had priority over all the other debts. He ordered that after the claim of the Secretary of State was fully satisfied out of the amount in deposit the balance should be rateably distributed among the various creditors excluding the Lyallpur Bank. With regard to the Bank he held that as the Bank held only an order under Section 186, Companies Act, it could not be said to hold a decree within the meaning of Section 73, Civil P.C. Ramji Das claimed to be entitled to have the entire amount of his decree paid out of the deposit but this claim was overruled by the learned Judge who held him entitled only to a rateable share. Application No. 153 has been brought by the Lyallpur Bank against the dismissal of its claim and Application No. 191 has been filed by Ramji Das against the finding of the learned Judge that he is entitled only to a rateable share of the assets. The other creditors have submitted to the order of the learned Judge.

3. The learned Counsel for Messrs. Bird & Co., opposite party No. 13 in the Lyallpur Bank's application, has raised a preliminary objection against both the applications on the ground that no revision lies against the order in question. His first ground is that the order passed by the learned District Judge is an administrative and not a judicial order so as to be subject to revision under Section 115, Civil P.C. For this proposition, learned Counsel relies on the case in Shankar Sarup v. Mejo Mal (1901) 23 All 313, but all that was held in that case was that an order under Section 295 of the (old) Code of Civil Procedure for the distribution of the price of property sold in execution amongst the decree-holders is a step in an execution proceeding and does not import a conclusive adjudication as to rights of priority. The learned Counsel relies on the following remark of their Lordships at page 209:

The scheme of Section 295 is rather to enable the Judge as a matter of administration to distribute the price according to what seem at the time to be the rights of parties, wi