JUDGMENT

1. This is a defendants' appeal arising out of a suit for accounts consequent on the dissolution of a partnership which was alleged to have occurred on 31st August 1931. The trial Court passed a preliminary decree for accounts. The defendants went up in appeal and the lower Appellate Court held that the appeal had been filed beyond time and dismissed it. An application under Section 5, Limitation Act, for admission of the appeal after the period of limitation was also rejected by the lower Appellate Court. The question of limitation in the Court below arose out of the following facts: The judgment of the trial Court was delivered on 14th May 1936, but the decree was not signed till 23rd May 1936. An application for copies of the judgment and decree was made by the defendants on 22nd May 1936, which were ready on 2nd July 1936. The appeal was actually filed in Court on 31st July 1936. The defendants-appellants' contention was that time between 14th May 1936, the date on which the judgment was delivered and 23rd May 1936. the date on which the decree was signed should be excluded under Section 12(2), Limitation Act, as "time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree." The lower Appellate Court held that under the said Section no time prior to 22nd May 1936, could be excluded in law. In appeal before us, the learned Counsel for the defendants-appellants has raised the same contention, that is that time between 14th May 1936 and 23rd May 1936, should have been excluded in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal in the lower Appellate Court. It is further con tended that his application under Section 5, Limitation Act, should have been allowed.

2. The learned Counsel for the appellant has relied upon Beni Madhub Mitter v. Matungini Dassi (1886) 18 Cal 104 (FB), and Ram Asray Singh v. Sheonandan Singh (1916) 3 AIR Pat 267, of the Patna High Court. On behalf of the respondent, reliance has been placed upon 12 All 461 Bechi v. Ahasanullah Khan (1890) 12 All 461 3. The question in controversy turns upon whether the time that elapses between the date on which the judgment is delivered and the date on which the decree is actually signed can be included in the "time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree," which occur in Section 12, Limitation Act. The object of this Section is to exclude such time taken in obtaining a copy of the decree as is beyond the control of the appellant. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in J.N. Surty v. T.S. Chettyar Firm (1928) 15 AIR PC 103 in interpreting the word "requisite" have observed as follows:

The word "requisite" is a strong word ; it may be regarded as meaning something more than the word "required." It means "properly required," and it throws upon the pleader or counsel for the appellant the necessity of showing that no part of the delay beyond the prescribed period is due to his default.

But for that time which is taken up by his opponent in drawing up the decree, or by the officials of the Court in preparing and issuing the two documents, he is not responsible.

3. Now this interpretation by their Lord ships of the Privy Council in our opinion shows that the time requisite is not restricted to the time taken by the applicant personally but also refers to the time taken by the office in proper cases. It has to be borne in mind that in some cases, e. g. a suit for partition or a suit for meane profits it is necessary for a party to the suit to file a stamp or court-fee in order to enable the office to prepare a decree but ordinarily the parties to the suit have nothing to do in the matter of the preparation of the decree. It is the duty of the Court to have a decree prepared in as short a time as possible and to sign it. From the observations of the Privy Council quoted above it follows that at any rate in those cases-where the drawing up of the decree depends entirely upon the officials of the Court, the appellant is not answerable for the time spent between