JUDGMENT

Radha Krishna, J - This is the lambardar's appeal arising out of a suit for profits and the only question argued in this Court is as to whether ten per cent. on collection is the maximum that can be allowed to him as held by the learned District Judge. In the Courts below on behalf of the lambardar account-books consisting of Exs. A-1 to A-70 were filed to show the actual and legitimate amounts of expenses incurred by him in making collections. The learned District Judge did not think it necessary to. discuss that evidence because on the basis of a decision of this Court in Mt. Amina Bibi v. Mt. Umme Asia (1931) 18 AIR Oudh 318 he was of opinion that the maximum amount to be allowed to the lambardar was ten per cent. over collections and no more. I regret I am unable to agree with the view of law in the abstract form in which the learned District Judge has accepted it. There is no rule of law fixing the maxi-mum limit of the amount of expenses to be allowed to a lambardar for collection of rents. It may be that the standard of ten per cent. may be taken into consideration in examining whether the expenses claimed are proper and legitimate in the circumstances of a particular case or not.

2. My attention has been drawn to Iqbal Narain v. Suraj Narain (1914) 1 AIR Oudh 231, Kamta Singh v. Mata Bhikh Singh (1922) 9 AIR Oudh 107 and Mt. Amina Bibi v. Mt. Umme Asia (1931) 18 AIR Oudh 318. In Iqbal Narain v. Suraj Narain (1914) 1 AIR Oudh 231. Mr. Lindsay (later Lindsay J.) observed that ten per cent. was generally recognized as a reasonable amount of collection charges and a percentage to this extent was often allowed even in cases where the defendant had been a trespasser. In Kamta Singh v. Mata Bhikh Singh (1922) 9 AIR Oudh 107 in view of the smallness of the amount of the share of the plaintiff and the fact that 5 per cent, on account of the-lambardari dues on the Government revenue had been allowed to the lambardar the learned Judicial Commissioner expressed the view that it was manifestly improper to allow him another ten per cent. on the same on account of the alleged costs of collection. In Mt. Amina Bibi v. Mt. Umme Asia (1931) 18 AIR Oudh 318 a Bench of this Court at p. 174 observed as follows:

The defendant has been allowed ten per cent. on account of costs of collection over and above five-per cent. lambardari dues. The defendant cannot get more than that.

3. The proper construction of the above observation is not that it was laid down as a rule of law that no more than ten per cent. on account of costs of collection was allowable. In my opinion the observation must be read as confined to the facts of that case. On a perusal of all these decisions it is clear that they were cases where the lambardar had not produced any evidence to prove his actual expenses. The question involved in all these cases was as to what would be the fair percentage to allow to a lambardar for collection charges where there was no direct and definite evidence to prove them. I am of opinion that the rule laid down in the above cases is not applicable to the present case where the appellant produced account-books and undertook to prove his collection expenses definitely. The learned District Judge disposed of the appeal on a preliminary point on which his decision has been reversed. I therefore allow the appeal and remand the case to his Court for decision of the question of the amount of actual and legitimate expenses incurred by the appellant as costs of collection and for decision of the appeal. The appeal will be admitted at its original number and disposed of according to law and in the light of the observations in this judgment. Costs in this Court and hitherto will abide the result.