JUDGMENT

Hamilton, J - The question which has been referred for decision by the Divisional Bench runs as follows:

Does Act 2 of 1929 apply only to a son's daughter, daughter's daughter, sister and sister's son governed by the rules of inheritance of a sub-school of the Mitakshara law which recognized them as heirs before the Act the Act being intended only to alter the order of precedence of existing heirs or does the Act go further and apply to persons, governed by the rules of inheritance of other sub-schools of the Mitakshara which do not recognize the son's daughter, daughter's daughter, sister and. sister's son as heirs with the result that these persons are created heirs by the Act ?

2. Before dealing with the language of the Act, I consider it advisable to refer to certain principles which govern the interpretation of statutes as I shall base my decision on those principles as I understand them. In the first place there is no presumption that when one view as to the meaning of an Act would apply the Act to a larger number and another view to a smaller number, the Legislature meant it to affect the larger number. There is a presumption that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantial alteration in the law beyond what it explicitly declares either in express terms or by clear implication, or, in other words, beyond the immediate scope and object of the statute: vide Trevor J. Arthur v. Bokenham 11 Mod 15; Harbert's case 3 Rep 13b; Rolfe v. Flower (1866) LR 1 PC 27, at p. 48. It is in the lastdegree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness (2 Cranch 390). It also follows that when there is a choice between the adoption of a.wider or a narrower application, the adoption of the narrower application does not make the Act wholly inapplicable. It will make the Act inapplicable to those who do not come within the narrower meaning, but one has to see from the Act whether the narrower or the wider meaning was intended by the Legislature. The scope of the Act is to be gathered from the Act as a whole, and it is now beyond doubt that the Preamble is part of the Act. If however the language and the object and the scope of the Act are not open to doubt the Sections of the Act override the Preamble. This however does not mean that if there is nothing in the Sections clearly against the wider meaning one is justified in applying the wider meaning, for there is no presumption in favour of the wider meaning against the narrower meaning. In this connexion I would refer to certain cases. In an American case on an American statute Peters 301 Board v. Rowan (1835) 9 Peters 301 the Act authorized aliens who "shall have been resident" in the country for two years to hold land, and the question was whether the Act was to be limited to persons who had so resided before the passing of the Act, or extend to those who should at any time reside for the required time. Prima facie, the language was sufficiently wide to include the wider meaning being adopted, but the Preamble was resorted to in order to determine which of the two meanings was the more agreeable to the policy and object of the Act.

3. The Refreshment Houses Act, 1860, made it penal for a publican to allow bad characters to assemble and meet together in his house. This prima facie was sufficiently wide to embrace assembling and meeting together for any purpose whatsoever, but the Preamble was resorted to and it showed that the object of the statute was the repression of disorderly conduct, not the absolute denial of all hospitality to persons of bad character, and the Act was not broken if the publican permitted such persons to enter for taking refreshment and to remain there as long as was reasonably necessary for that purpose: Belasco v. Hannant (1862) 81 LJMC 225. 26 George III was an Act which empowered every person who had