1939 Supreme(Oudh) 51
HIGH COURT OF OUDH
Hamilton, J.
Bachan Lal - Appellant
Versus
Gobardhan - Respondent
Decided On : 24-11-1939
JUDGMENT
Hamilton, J - This is a second appeal by a defendant against whom a decree was passed and whose appeal was dismissed by the Additional Civil Judge. The facts, as far as they affect this appeal, are that one Badlu owned 32 pies in village Narharpur. In 1866 he sold a 16 pies share, that is to say half of what he owned, to the plaintiffs but distinctly stated that he reserved his residential house. He made other sales of part of his share in which he did not mention the house, but eventually in 1891 he sold a two pies share, which was all that he had left, to the plaintiffs and in this deed he expressly declared that he was selling the entire residential house. The defendants urged that as in deeds in their favour there was no express mention of the house being excluded as had been done in the deed of 1886 they were entitled to a share in the house, This view found favour in the Courts below, but the suit was nevertheless dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff had possession over the whole house. The learned Additional Civil Judge refers to Balram Singh v. Ganga Singh (1926) 13 AIR Oudh 358 and Krishna Kumari Debi v. Rajendra Bahadur Singh Deo (1927) 14 AIR Oudh 240 as supporting his view that when there is no mention in a deed that the sale of a share does not include the sale of a house standing on that share it must be held that the house goes with the share. These authorities hold good in a case where a complete share has been sold and nothing is reserved and therefore it is presumed that a house standing on this share is also sold. The same presumption does not arise when the whole share is not sold but only a part of it because when only a part of a share is sold much is reserved as for instance the balance of the share which is not sold. I know of no authority to the effect that when a person buys part of another person's share in a village the presumption is that he buys a corresponding share in the house of his vendor in the village. I am not therefore prepared to hold that because, when a whole share is sold it is presumed that a house on it is sold, one should also hold that when part of a share is sold a similar share in a house in the share must be sold. This being so, there is no force in this appeal which is dismissed with costs.