JUDGMENT

Hamilton, J - This is an appeal by a plaintiff who had succeeded in the original Court but whose suit was dismissed by a Civil Judge on an appeal by the defendants. The plaintiff had been given certain property for life as maintenance (bataur guzara hin hayati). The donors were two brothers, Ganpat and Narpat, and the plaintiff donee was the widowed daughter-in-law of Narpat. There can be no doubt that the reason for the gift in her favour was her relationship to Narpat. The learned Civil Judge held that because a widow under Hindu law is entitled to maintenance only if she is chaste, and the plaintiff in this case is not chaste, therefore she is not entitled to recover possession of the land gifted to her for life from which she has been dispossessed. It is true that a Hindu widow is only entitled to maintenance if she is chaste, but this is not a suit for maintenance by a Hindu widow. This is a suit to recover certain specified land on the basis of a deed of gift, so that the title of the plaintiff, if any, is not based on Hindu law but on a deed. This distinction was pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Lakshmi Chand v. Mt. Anandi (1935) 22 AIR PC 180 where they pointed out that land which had been given by a deed to a Hindu widow was not maintenance but an interest in that land, and the interest of a Hindu widow once acquired was unaffected by the chastity of the widow. If a Hindu widow sued for maintenance, she would not be suing for any rights in particular land but for an amount which would enable her to live and that would constitute maintenance.

2. There is no doubt that had she sued for maintenance in the present case, she could not have claimed a life-interest in half the property of Narpat and Ganpat, so her rights to it were not maintenance even if she was given those rights in lieu of any maintenance which she might in law have claimed. The most that can be said therefore is that although this land did not constitute maintenance, the use of the word "guzara" must be read as a condition that the gift held good only during her chastity. I do not see how the mere use of the word "guzara" can be held to imply that the donors meant to put into a will a condition of chastity in accordance with Hindu law in cases of maintenance. In the circumstances, it is impossible to hold that Hindu law applies or that the condition of chastity must be read into the gift especially seeing that it is proved that the plaintiff had a child in 1932 and one of the donors did not die till 1934. Had he intended that his gift was conditional on the chastity of the donee he would presumably have taken some steps to revoke the gift when he saw that the condition was not fulfilled by the donee. The fact that he took no steps is further justification for holding that there was no condition of chastity in the deed of gift. I therefore allow the appeal and restore the decision of the original Court decreeing the suit with costs in all Courts.