1941 Supreme(Oudh) 9
HIGH COURT OF OUDH
Ghulam Hasan, J.
Harbans Singh - Appellant
Versus
Ram Chandra - Respondent
Decided On : 07-10-1941
JUDGMENT
Ghulam Hasan, J - This is an execution of decree appeal by the decree-holder against the judgment and decree, dated 19th May 1939 passed by the District Judge of Unao, reversing the order passed by the Assistant Collector of the first class and dismissing the application for execution as time barred. On 13th October 1934, the plaintiff-appellant obtained a decree for Rs. 963-13-0 for arrears of revenue against the defendants-respondents under Section 108, Clause 16, Oudh Rent Act. After the judgment was pronounced, it transpired that there was a deficiency in court-fee paid on the plaint. The decree-holder was consequently directed to pay up the deficiency in court-fee by a certain date. The deficiency having been made good, presumably after several months-there is no clear indication on the record as to when the deficiency was made good-the decree was actually prepared and signed by the Court on 2nd March 1935. An application for execution was made on 22nd February 1938, within three years from 2nd March 1935, but beyond three years from 13th October' 1934. The judgment-debtors raised an objection to the application on the ground that it was time-barred. The learned Assistant Collector held that the application for execution was within time, while the learned District Judge in appeal by some of the judgment-debtors, set aside that view and held that the application was time-barred. The learned District Judge in coming to this decision against the appellant, recorded the view that neither Article 181 nor Art 182, Limitation Act, applied to the case. According to the learned District Judge the execution of the decree in question was governed by the first portion of Section 145, Oudh Rent Act, which laid down that the execution was to be taken out within three years from the date of the decree, unless the decree was for a sum exceeding Rs. 500. The learned District Judge thereupon set aside the order of the Assistant Collector in favour of all the judgment-debtors, although some of them had not appealed and had acquiesced in the order. There is no doubt whatever that the learned District Judge was entitled to reverse the order of the Assistant Collector in toto under the provisions of Order 41, Rule 4, Civil P.C.
2. In appeal it has been contended before me on behalf of the decree-holder that the view taken by the lower appellate Court is wrong, and that Article 181, Limitation Act, applies to the case. It is argued that under that article three years' period is to be computed from the date when the right to apply accrues to the decree-holder, and in the present case the right to apply did not accrue until the decree had been actually prepared, namely on 2nd March 1935. I am unable to accept this contention. Section 145, Oudh Rent Act, runs thus:
A process of execution shall not be issued on a decree under this Act, when the application for the issue of the process is made after the lapse of three years from the date of the decree, unless the decree is for a sum exceeding Rs. 500, in which case the ' period within which execution may be had shall be regulated by the law for the time being in force as to the period allowed for the execution of decrees of civil Courts.
3. It is clear therefore that if a decree is for a sum exceeding Rs. 500, the period within which execution may be had shall be regulated by the law for the time being in force as to the period allowed for the execution of decrees of civil Courts. As I have already stated, the decree in the present case was for a sum of Rs. 963-13-0. It appears however that in the application for execution the liability of the various judgment-debtors was separately specified, and the liability of none; of the individual judgment-debtors exceeded Rs. 500. It may well be that the learned District Judge was misled by the separate apportionment of the liabilities of the judgment-debtors in the application into thinking that there were several decrees in the case, and that each