JUDGMENT

Bennett, J - This is an application in revision under Section 25, Small Cause Courts Act, against an order passed by the learned civil Judge of Kheri on 3rd December 1938, dismissing an application in execution as time-barred. The application was made by the decree-holder Mata Din on a decree passed on 25th July 1934. The decree was for rupees 281-12-0 with costs and interest, and it provided for payment by instalments of Rs. 50 commencing from January 1935, two instalments to be paid in each year, in January and July. The application shows that no such instalments were paid by the judgment-debtor in these months, but that he made the following payments:

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2. It is stated in the application that the first three instalments had been certified. The office report on the application shows however that only the first two instalments had been certified. This is not disputed. The decree-holder calculated the balance due to him after addition of interest as Rs. 262-9-0. Nothing has been said in this application with regard to the calculation. The application in execution was made on 15th November 1938. It states that under the decree the entire "amount fell due in default of payment of any instalment, and this is borne out by the decree. The wording of the decree is that "in case of any default the whole shall accrue due at once." The civil Judge observed that default took place in January 1935, when the first instalment was not paid. The application in execution was made long after the three years' period prescribed by Article 182, Limitation Act, and was therefore time-barred.

3. Against this finding it has been contended that there are authorities which support the view that in these circumstances an application in execution is within time so far as the instalments falling due within three years of the application are concerned. In particular learned Counsel for the applicant referred to two decisions of this Court, Lal Bhadur v. Mathura Prasad, A.I.R. 1934 Oudh 334 and Ajodhia Prasad v. Bansi Lal, A.I.R. 1935 Oudh. 465. The former case was decided by a single Judge and the latter by a Pull Bench. In the first case it was said that where a compromise decree is payable by instalments and it is further stipulated that in case of default in payment of any instalment on the due date, the decree-holder may realise the entire decree-money, the decree-holder becomes entitled under the terms of the compromise to apply for the recovery of the entire amount whenever there is a default in payment of any of the instalments and the case is governed by Article 182, Clause (7), Limitation Act. The decree-holder is therefore entitled to enforce his claim for the payment of the entire amount due except in respect of such amount as has become time-barred. The Pull Bench came to the same conclusion in the second case, where it was said that an application made more than three years after the first default, but relating only to instalments which fell due within three years is within time, it being governed by Article 182(7), Limitation Act. Towards the end of the judgment it was observed:

It may be noted that in some cases a distinction has been drawn between eases in which the default clause gives the decree-holder option to execute his decree for the whole amount and those in which the decree makes it obligatory for the decree-holder on the occurrence of a default to put the decree into execution. We do not feel called upon for the purpose of this case to discuss whether such a distinction can be validly made or not because in the present case the decree clearly makes it optional for the decree-holders to put the whole decree into execution and does not compel them to do so.

4. This is not the position in the case under consideration, because the decree clearly provides that on the first default the whole amount becomes due. It is not said that the decree-holder may execute his decree for the whole amount. There is also to be taken into