1941 Supreme(Oudh) 45
HIGH COURT OF OUDH
Nawab Muniruddaulah Dilwar Husain - Appellant
Versus
Chaudhari Abdur Rahman, Official Receiver - Respondent
Decided On : 02-10-1941
JUDGMENT
1. This revision application under Section 75(1), Provincial Insolvency Act, is directed against an order of the District Judge of Lucknow, dated 24th August 1940, upholding in appeal the order passed by the Judge, Small Cause Court, acting as an Insolvency Judge, under Section 27(2), Provincial Insolvency Act. The facts giving rise to the application are as follows:
The applicant was declared an insolvent on 20th October 1938, upon an application presented by him to the insolvency Court. The applicant admitted in his application that on a previous occasion he had applied to be adjudged an insolvent, but the application was consigned to the record as he did not deposit the publication charges of the Gazette and newspapers. The applicant was given six months' time within which he was to apply for his discharge. This time was due to expire on 20th April 1939. On 13th April 1939, before the expiry of the period of his discharge, the applicant put in a petition for discharge. Notices were issued to the creditors and to the Official Receiver. The application for discharge was fixed for hearing on 11th May 1939. On this date objections were filed by some of the creditors and time was obtained by others to file objections. The Official Receiver had also not filed his report. The case was therefore fixed for orders on 18th July 1939. On this date the insolvent did not appear. Objections were, however, filed to the application for discharge by certain creditors on this date. One of the creditors filed an application in which it was stated that the insolvent's mother had died on 28th May 1939, and that the insolvent had inherited considerable property on the death of his mother, the value of which was shown in the objections as nearly three lacs. It was prayed that as a receiver had already been appointed to deal with the property of the insolvent, the period of discharge be extended under Section 27(2), Provincial Insolvency Act. The insolvency Court thereupon extended the period of discharge for one year. The learned District Judge in appeal declined to interfere with the order of the trial Court. This application has now been filed in this Court in revision against the appellate order of the learned District Judge.
2. It has been contended by the learned Counsel on behalf of the applicant that in view of the fact that the applicant did not appear on the date fixed for the hearing of the application for discharge, the only course open to the Insolvency Court was to annul the adjudication and to apply the provisions of Section 37, Provincial Insolvency Act, and that it had no jurisdiction whatever to act under Section 27(2) and extend the time for discharge. In support of this contention the learned Counsel has relied upon the provisions of Sections 27 and 43 and the case reported in Bakaram Bapuji v. Manglya Adku, A.I.R. 1937 Nag. 37 Section 27, Clause (2), runs as follows:
The Court may, if sufficient cause is shown extend the period within which the debtor shall apply for his discharge, and in that case shall publish notice of the order in such manner as it thinks fit.
3. Section 43, Clause (1) is as follows:
If the debtor does not appear on the day fixed for hearing his application for discharge, or on such subsequent days as the Court may direct, or if the debtor does not apply for an order of discharge within the period specified by the Court, the order of adjudication shall be annulled, and the provisions of Section 37 shall apply accordingly.
4. It has been argued that the case falls under the first part of Section 43(1), and that as the applicant had already put in an application for discharge before the expiry of the period for such discharge, no question of extending the time within which the applicant should have applied for discharge could possibly arise in the case, and consequently the provisions of Section 27(2) did not come into play and the Insolvency Court had no jurisdiction to act under that section and ext