JUDGMENT

Agarwal, J - This second appeal arises out of a suit brought by the plaintiff-appellant for the recovery of Rs. 526-8-0 on the basis of a mortgagee deed dated 17th February 1922, executed by Bindeshri Singh in his favour. Bindeshri Singh died before the institution of the suit and the names of his son Bhan Pratap Singh and grandson' Ram Chandra son of another son Antu Singh were entered over the mortgaged property. The plaintiff brought the suit against Ram Chandra alone who-took several pleas and also that his uncle Bhan Pratap Singh had not been made a party. Bhan Pratap Singh was then made a party but this was after the expiry of the period of limitation.

2. Both the Courts below have dismissed the suit on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The plaintiff wanted to rely on a promissory note dated 13th June 1926, to enlarge the ordinary period of limitation but it has been held by both the Courts below that it has not been shown that the promissory note was executed in lieu of the interest of the bond in suit as alleged by the plaintiff. The point which I have to consider is whether or not the suit is barred by time. The learned Counsel for the appellant has relied on Davalava v. Bhimaji Dhondo, 1996. 20 Bom. 338, Virchand Vajikaranshet v. Kondu, AIR1915Bom272 , Chaturbhuj Doss Kushaldoss & Sons v. Rajamanicka Mudali, A.I.R. 1930 Mad. 930 and Adi Lakshmi v. Durgamma, A.I.R. 1935 Mad. 737.

3. In Davalava v. Bhimaji Dhondo, 1996. Bom. 338, the mortgagee had obtained a decree for sale against one of several heirs of the mortgagor and the property was sold. The heirs who were not parties to the suit then brought a suit to redeem the mortgage on the allegation that the sale was not binding on them. It was held that they could not do so and they were bound by the decree for sale. In Chaturbhuj Doss Kushaldoss & Sons v. Rajamanicka Mudali, A.I.R. 1930 Mad. 930 also, property had been sold in execution of a decree obtained against the widow of the deceased debtor and it was held in the suit brought by the legatees of the deceased debtor that the decree obtained against the widow was binding on them. These cases are distinguishable from the present one.

4. In Virchand Vajikaranshet v. Kondu, AIR1915Bom272 , the mortgage suit was brought against the only son of the deceased mortgagor and the widow and two daughters of the deceased were made defendants, after the expiry of the period of limitation. It was held that the suit was not barred by time against any of the defendants. In Adi Lakshmi v. Durgamma, A.I.R. 1935 Mad. 737, a suit was brought against the widow of the debtor and his daughter and grandson were impleaded after the expiry of the period of limitation but it was held that the whole suit was within time. I regret I am unable to follow these last two cases. The Bombay High Court itself in Shahasaheb v. Sadashiv Supdu, AIR1919Bom135 did not agree with the view laid down in Virchand Vajikaranshet v. Kondu, AIR1915Bom272 that the mortgage decree obtained against one of several heirs of a Mohamedan would bind the other co-heirs. The Allahabad High Court in Manni Gir v. Amar Jati Chela, AIR1936All94 expressly dissented from the view taken in Davalava v. Bhimaji Dhondo, 1996.Bom. 338 and Virchand Vajikaranshet v. Kondu, AIR1915Bom272 . It was held that where in a suit by a creditor, certain persons are impleaded as defendants as being in possession of property belonging to the debtor and only one of them is impleaded within the period of limitation, while the others are joined after such period, the mere fact that one of them is impleaded within time does not warrant the passing of a decree against the others and the decree obtained against the one cannot therefore be executed against the assets of the debtor in the hands of the others. I agree with the view of the Allahabad High Court and am of opinion that if a suit is brought against one of the several heirs of a mortgagor and the other heirs are impleaded aft