JUDGMENT

1. This judgment will cover two appeals. The plaintiffs had to file two appeals as there were two orders. The plaintiffs filed a suit for possession of plot No. 975 and damages with some other reliefs. They alleged that certain trees had been planted without right and that the defendants had stacked a large number of bricks on the plot. The suit was filed on 28th October 1988, and on 25th March 1939, there was an application signed by plaintiffs 1 and 3 and by the defendants, and by Thakur Bechu Singh, counsel for all the three plaintiffs, praying that Mr. Abdus Samad Advocate be appointed arbitrator. Mr. Abdus Samad was appointed and asked to file his award on 13th April 1939. Ten days were allowed for objections to the award. The award was filed on the due date, and objections were filed by plaintiffs 1 and 2 on 22nd April 1989. On 27th April 1939, the trial Court held that plaintiffs 1 and 3 were bound, but framed an issue about the competency of Thakur Bechu Singh to refer the case to arbitration for plaintiff 2. On 20th May 1939, the trial Court set aside the award on the ground that Thakur Bechu Singh was not competent to refer the case to arbitration for plaintiff 2, and judgment was passed on 28th November 1940, after hearing evidence and arguments The plaintiffs were decreed possession and Rs. 6 as damages for stacking bricks. The planting of trees was held not to be proved. Both plaintiffs and defendants filed appeals against this decision. The plaintiffs' appeal was dismissed by the lower appellate Court and the defendants' appeal was allowed to the extent that the finding that Thakur Bechu Singh had no authority to refer the case to arbitration was set aside. The case was remanded under Order 41, Rule 23, Civil P.C., because all the objections to the award had not been decided by the trial Court. On the other side, it has been argued that no appeal lies. Nabi Mohammad Khan v. Mohammad Ahsan, A.I.R. 1939 Oud 238 has been cited, in which it was held:

No revision lies from an order in a pending suit setting aside the award under para. 15 of Schedule 2, Civil P.C., and superseding the arbitration.

2. We do not think that this decision has any application to the present case. This is. a miscellaneous appeal and not a revision. The suit was decided by the trial Court, but since the award was set aside on one ground only and other grounds alleged by the objectors were not considered, the suit was remanded and an appeal lay under Order 43, Rule 1(u), Civil P.C. As to the merits of these appeals, the question is whether the vakalat nama of Thakur Bechu Singh gives him authority to refer the case to arbitration. The appellate Court held not only that he had authority under the vakalatnama but also that plaintiff 2 by appearing before the arbitrator on two days without objection, showed by his conduct that the reference to arbitration was made with the consent. The appellant's learned Counsel argues, first that there is no evidence that plaintiff 2 appeared before the arbitrator. Secondly, he argues, it is not proved that plaintiff 2 made any payment of fees as the lower Court seems to think. Thirdly, he says that the lower appellate Court has wrongly interpreted the vakalatnama. The fact that it gives him power to appoint an arbitrator does not mean that it gives him power to refer the case to arbitration. The vakalatnama must be strictly interpreted. In Ram Kirat v. Gajadhar Shukla, A.I.R. 1930 Oud 112 it has been held that the power to file a compromise given in a 'vakalatnama does not involve the power to enter into a compromise. This is based on Mt. Hubraji v. Chandra Ball, A.I.R. 1928 Oud 386. This, however, specially refers to the case of pardanashin ladies.

3. In Kalpi Singh v. Bachchu Singh, A.I.R. 1934 Oud 417 a Single Judge of this Court held that the words in a vakalatnama "Sulehnama ya baz dawa dakhil karen" do not authorise a pleader to enter into a compromise. The implication is that he has the power to