JUDGMENT

1. This is an appeal by the plaintiffs and arises out of the following circumstances: The respondents made a complaint against the appellants in the criminal Court under Sections 447 and 147, Penal Code. The complaint was heard by a Special Magistrate who acquitted the appellants on 23rd February 1937. The complainants filed a revision in the Court of the District Magistrate and he made a reference to this Court on 29th April 1937, that the acquittal of the present appellants be set aside. This reference was rejected by this Court on 15th September 1937. The present appellants brought this suit on 12th September 1938. It is to recover Rs. 250 as damages for malicious prosecution. The suit was dismissed by the first two Courts on the ground that it was barred by time. The plaintiffs filed a second appeal in this Court and one of the learned Judges of this Court admitted the appeal and further directed that it be laid before a Bench under the provisions of Section 14(2), Oudh Courts Act. The Courts below have held that limitation began to run from the date of acquittal of the plaintiffs on 23rd February 1937.

2. It is contended on behalf of the appellants that limitation should run from 15th September 1937, when this Court refused to interfere with the order of acquittal. The article of the Limitation Act applicable is Article 23. It provides for a period of one year from the date the plaintiff is acquitted or the prosecution is otherwise terminated. The Courts below have relied on Shanker Prasad v. Sheo Narain, A.I.R. 1935 Oudh. 392. Nanavutty, J. held in that case that limitation began to run from the date of acquittal and that Section 9, Limitation Act, provided that no subsequent disability or inability to sue stops the time when once it begins to run and so the fact that an application for revision against an order of acquittal was made did not entitle the plaintiff to say that he could bring a suit within one year of the date of the refusal of the revision application. We are of opinion that limitation begins to run from the date when the prosecution is terminated by acquittal or otherwise. The point to be considered therefore is when the prosecution terminated. If it terminated when the reference made by the District Magistrate was rejected by this Court, time began to run from 15th September 1937 and Section 9 has no application. The learned Judge who decided the case, Shanker Prasad v. Sheo Narain, A.I.R. 1935 Oudh. 392, was of opinion that in case of acquittals time begins to run from the date of the acquittal and not from the date of any subsequent order. He relied on Narayya v. Seshayya, (1900) 23 Mad. 24 and Purshottam Vithaldas v. Raoji Hari, A.I.R. 1922 Bom. 209. The Madras case was overruled by a Full Bench of that Court in Kulasekara Chetty v. Tholasingam Chetty, A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 349. In that case it was held that time begins to run from the dismissal of the revision petition and not from the date of acquittal. The learned Judges referred to Balbhaddar Singh v. Badri Sah, A.I.R. 1926 P.C. 46 There was no point of limitation in that case but it throws a light on the question when the prosecution terminates. In that case the Magistrate discharged the plaintiffs on 30th December 1919. The Sessions Judge issued notice to the plaintiffs to show cause why the order of discharge should not be set aside. Subsequently, the Sessions Judge refused to interfere with the order of discharge. It was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that the proceeding terminated when the Sessions Judge refused to commit the plaintiffs for trial. This case however is not very helpful in our opinion because there was no question of limitation before their Lordships but the principle which is applicable was laid down in Gilding v. Eyre, (1861) 10 C.B. (N.S.) 592 and is quoted in the Full Bench case in Kulasekara Chetty v. Tholasingam Chetty, A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 349.

It is a rule of law that no one shall be allowed, to allege of a