JUDGMENT

Madeley, J - This is a defendant's second appeal in a suit for specific performance and possession of a house which was formerly owned by Manni Lal. Kanhaiya Lal respondent 2 in the present ease became entitled to the house on his death, but one Janki was in possession and claimed the house by virtue of a deed of agreement with Manni Lal. In May 1933 Kanhaiya Lal brought a suit against Janki for recovery of possession, and on 19th 1943 0/12 & 13 May 1933, the former executed a deed of agreement with Baldeo Prasad plaintiff-respondent in this case, the terms being that Baldeo Prasad was to da "pairvi" in the case, and that if he did and won the case, Kanhaiya Lal would transfer to him one quarter of the house. Baldeo Prasad did "pairvi" and Kanhaiya Lal succeeded up to the Chief Court. Instead, however, of fulfilling his promise to Baldeo Prasad, Kanhaiya Lal endowed the whole house to Sri Mahadeoji. Thereupon Baldeo Prasad filed the present suit. The case of the defendant idol was first that the agreement of 19th May 1933, was not for legal consideration but was fraudulent and amounted to a wagering contract. It was therefore against public policy. Secondly, that the house, being a small one, was not suitable for partition, and that if the plaintiff should succeed, he should be given money compensation. Thirdly that the agreement of 19th May 1983 was bad for want of registration.

2. The trial Court decided the suit in favour of the plaintiff but gave money compensation. The lower appellate Court agreed with the trial Court excepting with regard to the relief. It decreed one-quarter of the house in favour of the plaintiff. The only two points argued before me are (1) that the contract is void ab initio and cannot be enforced on account of lack of reciprocity and because the promise made by the plaintiff was one for future personal services, and (2) that money compensation should have been given. Appellant's learned Counsel has cited two rulings, Hurry Krishna Pillai v. Authilachmy Ammal, A.I.R. 1916 L.R. 51 a Full Bench decision of the Chief Court of Lower Burma. This case, however, has been decided on the ground of public policy because the agreement was in restraint of trade. It is true that at p. 241, col. 2, para. 3 the question of reciprocity has been discussed, but it scarcely seems to have been necessary in view of the main ground on which the case had been decided. The other decision is contained in Basant Kumar v. Madan Mohan, AIR1919Cal765 The agreement which the Court refused to enforce ran:

I have been very much benefited by the works done by you and there is possibility of more good being done by you in future. In consideration of those benefits I actuated by my sense of duty, promise to grant you for your enjoyment a life-long annuity of Rs. 150.

3. The agreement was held on the strength of Section 25, Contract Act, to be enforceable so far as it related to past services, but not so far as it related to future services, and since it was one and indivisible and it wag impossible to apportion the promised reward between the past and the future, the whole agreement was void. Upon this foundation the appellant's learned Counsel has tried to erect a theory that promises relating to future services do not amount to consideration. This is obviously incorrect. Section 2, Contract Act, where contract is defined, says clearly:

Every promise and every set of promises, forming the consideration for each other, is an agreement. Promises which form the consideration or part of the consideration for each other are called reciprocal promises: An agreement enforceable by law is a contract.

4. There is nothing to show that a promise to afford future personal service is not good consideration. The mere fact that specific performance of such a contract cannot be enforced does not make the contract bad. Section 25 when it provides that a promise to compensate, wholly or in part a person who has already voluntarily done someth