JUDGMENT

1. This is a first civil appeal against the judgment and decree of the learned Civil Judge, Bahraich, dismissing the appellants' suit on the ground that its subject-matter was also the subject-matter of proceedings before a Special Judge, under Section 11, U.P. Encumbered Estates Act.

2. The litigation arose out of the execution of a deed of gift by Ranjit Singh on 4th June 1930, in favour of his son, Mohammad Mohiuddin Khan. Ranjit Singh made an application under Section 4, Encumbered Estates Act, on 20th October 1936, and did not include in his list of property the property transferred by this deed. The record of the proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act is not before us, and counsel were not at first agreed as to whether the property in question had been brought to the notice of the Special Judge under Sections 10 and 11 of the Act. The learned Counsel for the appellants, who at first disputed this, conceded after examination of certified copies of claims etc.; made in the case that certain claimants had alleged under Section 10 that the property belonged to Ranjit Singh, that it had been duly notified under Section 11, and that the donee, Mohammad Mohiuddin Khan, had claimed the property under Sub-section (2) of that section. This claim was made on 2nd March 1938. It was also admitted that issues on the claim were framed by the Special Judge, but that further proceedings were stayed pending decision of the appeal now before this Court.

3. The suit before the Civil Judge was instituted on 9th July 1937, that is some time prior to the claim of Mohammad Mohiuddin Khan, under Section 11. We understand that it had previously been alleged under Section 10 that the property was the property of Ranjit Singh, but no claim was made to it prior to 2nd March 1938. Objection was then taken before the Civil Judge by the respondents that the suit could not continue in view of the claim under the Encumbered Estates Act, and the Civil Judge framed a preliminary issue whether the suit was maintainable after this claim had been made. In his judgment, which is the subject of the present appeal, the Civil Judge considered the effect of Section 12 Encumbered Estates Act. This section confers power on the Special Judge to annul transfers made by a landlord between the day on which Chap. 1 of the Act came into force (i.e. 30th April 1935) and the day on which the application under Section 4 was made. Certain transfers are specially excepted by the section, and in regard to the provision in the section relating to them there was some controversy in the Court below, it being contended that the Special Judge was expressly barred from annulling a transfer made before the day on which Chap. 1 of the Act came into force. The Civil Judge, we have no doubt, rightly, rejected this contention and it has not been argued before us that there was any force in it. The learned Counsel for the appellants appeared to think, however, that the Civil Judge had in some way relied upon the provisions of Section 12 for his view that the Special Judge alone had jurisdiction. The Civil Judge held that it was incumbent upon the Special Judge to determine all claims made under Section 11 and that "his restriction under Section 12 does not apply to the present case." We understand that by this he meant that the power of the Special Judge to determine all claims under Section 11 is not restricted by the special provisions of Section 12 empowering him to annul certain transfers made between certain dates. The civil suit was brought by certain creditors on behalf of themselves and other creditors. It was alleged by them that the deed of gift was collusive and fictitious.

4. Learned Counsel for the respondents rested his case on the provisions of Sections 7 and 11, though under the former section, if it applies, the suit before the Civil Judge should have been only stayed, not dismissed. Section 7 governs all proceedings pending in any civil or revenue Court in r