1942 Supreme(Oudh) 53
HIGH COURT OF OUDH
Bennett, J.
Bhagwan Din - Appellant
Versus
Bhagwan Din - Respondent
Decided On : 07-05-1942
JUDGMENT
Bennett, J - This, an application in revision under Section 115, Civil P.C., against an order passed by the Munsif, East Hardoi on an application under Section 152, Civil P.C. It appears that an application under Section 12, Agriculturists' Relief Act, for the redemption of a mortgage was referred to arbitration. The arbitrator, an advocate of the Hardoi Bar, gave his award on 5th August 1939. The mortgage deed was of the year 1915 and it provided for interest at the rate of 2 per cent, per mensem. The award shows that the mortgagee was willing on certain conditions that the rate of interest should be reduced and that the arbitrator reduced it accordingly. As. the award stood at first he reduced it to 1 per cent, per annum with yearly rests from 4th May 1915. No objection was taken to the award at the time and it was made a decree of the Court. About a month later objection was taken to the award and decree on the ground that by mistake the, arbitrator wrote in his award 1 per cent, per annum instead of 1 per cent per mensem. Upon this the Munsif examined the arbitrator and also took other evidence adduced by the parties and held that there had been a clerical error. He corrected it accordingly under Section 152, that is, he substituted 1 per cent, per mensem for 1 per cent, per annum both in the award and in the decree. The present application in revision challenges the right of the Munsif to make this change, the main argument being that he acted illegally in the exercise of his jurisdiction in admitting the evidence of the arbitrator on the point. It is contended that in view of the provisions of Section 92 and other sections of the Evidence Act no evidence should have been admitted for the purpose of varying the terms of an award.
2. In support of this contention the learned Counsel for the applicant has referred to Sayamma v. Venkata Reddi, A.I.R. 1931 Mad. 785. In this case it was held that the fact that the terms of an instrument as they stand are so unusual as to show that the document cannot mean what it says, is not any ground for adding terms to an unambiguous deed. In that case the document under consideration was a deed of mortgage and the question under consideration was whether the interest upon the mortgage should be at the rate of Rs. 2 per cent, per month or at the rate of Rs. 2 per month. For the opposite party I have been referred to Mohammad Mumtaz Ali v. Mohammad Saadat ali, A.I.R. 1932 Oudh. 293 in which it was held that where an award contains an accidental mistake and a decree is passed in terms of the award the Court has power to amend the decree as well as the award upon which it is based. Paragraph 12 of Schedule 2, Civil P.C., empowers a Court to correct an award where it contains a clerical mistake and Para. 14 empowers a Court to remit the award to the arbitrator for amendment under certain circumstances. The question in the present case for consideration is whether after the award has been made a decree of the Court, the Court is entitled to amend it and for this purpose to refer to the arbitrator in order to ascertain whether there was a clerical mistake or not.
3. In my opinion, Section 92 and other sections of the Evidence Act relied upon by the applicant's counsel are not applicable to a case of this kind. There can be no doubt that had the mistake been a mistake of the Court itself it could have been corrected under Section 152, Civil P.C. The arbitrator occupied a position analogous to that of a Court and it was natural that the Munsif who passed the decree or the award should refer to the arbitrator for the purpose of ascertaining whether there had in fact been a clerical mistake as was alleged. It was for him to say whether there had been such an error just as it is for the Court itself to decide whether a clerical error has occurred in a judgment. The Munsif gave effect to his decision on this point. I am not therefore prepared to agree with the applicant's learned Counsel that