JUDGMENT

Agarwal, J - This is an application in revision against the order of the Additional District Magistrate of Lucknow upholding the conviction of the applicant by a Magistrate for breach of a bye-law made by the Municipal Board under Section 298J(c), that is for making a chabutra on nazul plot No. 685 situate in mauza Qutubpur without the permission of the Municipal Board. A preliminary objection has been taken by the learned Government Advocate that the applicant ought to have approached the Sessions Judge first and he cannot come direct to this Court. There is ample authority for this view but it is contended by the applicant's counsel that as the revision was admitted by this Court it should not be thrown out on this ground. This application for revision was filed on 10th March 1942. The Hon'ble Chief Judge passed an order on 31st March 1942 that the record be sent for. It was admitted on 24th April 1942 by the Honourable Madeley, J. It was held by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Shailabala Devi v. Emperor ('33) 20 A.I.R. 1933 All. 678 that once an application has been admitted and the record called for an objection that the application should have been made first to the Sessions Judge should not be entertained. The learned Government Advocate has relied on two rulings of this Court reported in Krishna Datta v. Badri, A.I.R. 1931 Oudh. 418 and Ajodhia Singh v. Kmperor, (33) 147 I.C. 797 in which it was held that the Oudh Chief Court is precluded from entertaining an application for revision by reason of the practice of the Court refusing to entertain an application in revision where the applicant has not gone in revision either to the Sessions Judge or the District Magistrate. It appears that in both these cases the opposite party had been called. But the point raised before me was not raised in either of the two oases. I agree with the reasoning given in the judgments of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court and hold that once the application has been admitted it should not be thrown out on the ground that the applicant ought to have gone to the Sessions Judge. I, therefore, proceed to decide the application on the merits. The first ground taken is that the provisions of Section 314, U.P. Municipalities Act, have not been complied with. Section 314 provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act or under any rule or byelaw except on the complaint or upon information received from the Board or some person authorized by the Board by general or special order in this behalf. It is admitted that the executive officer can make a complaint on behalf of the Board. The complaint is on a printed form and towards the end the words printed are:

Signature of officer applying for prosecution. Dated.

There is no signature or date on this application. Below this the following words are printed.

Forwarded to the City Magistrate through the Municipal Board for favour of prosecution.

Executive Officer.

2. Somebody appears to have signed below this forwarding note for the executive officer. The judgment of the Magistrate shows that the objection raised before him was that there was neither any signature of the officer applying for the prosecution nor a date. It is clear that the objection was as to the one signature below the words: "Signature of officer applying for prosecution." It may be accepted that the application itself was not signed by the officer applying for prosecution but under Section 314 cognizance can be taken on information received from the Board or some person authorized by the Board. The forwarding note shows that it was signed by somebody on behalf of the executive officer. No objection appears to have been taken that the forwarding note was not signed by a person authorized on behalf of the executive officer. Had such an objection been taken the prosecution could have shown that the person who had signed on behalf of the executive officer was duly authorized by