JUDGMENT

Agarwal, J - This is an application under Section 5, Limitation Act. The applicant has filed an appeal in this Court against the decision of the District Judge of Fyzabad in an appeal under the Encumbered Estates Act. An objection was made under Section 11 of the Act which was disallowed by the first Court but allowed by the District Judge in appeal. The District Judge passed his judgment in appeal on 3rd July 1941 and this appeal was filed on 10th April 1942. It is therefore barred by time. It is said that in view of certain rulings of this Court the petitioners were advised that no second appeal lay to this Court but these decisions were upset by a Full Bench of this Court on 7th March 1942, that that judgment was published in the issue of the Oudh Weekly Notes dated 30th March 1942 Debi Prasad v. Phundan Lal reported in, (42) 29 A.I.R. 1942 Oudh. 291 and the petitioners got information of that ruling only on 10th April 1942 and they filed the appeal that very day. It is prayed that time be extended.

2. It was held in Mowri Bewa v. Surendra Nath, (68) 10 W.R. 178 that a new statement of the law by the High Court was not sufficient excuse for delay in applying for a review of judgment, that is still less an excuse for delay in appealing against a judgment. I am therefore of opinion that the fact that this Court in March 1942 was of opinion that a second appeal lay is no ground for excusing the delay in filing the appeal. Had the present petitioners appealed, their appeal would nave been dismissed on the ground that no appeal lay and they could not apply for review of the judgment dismissing their appeal, A new ruling is no ground for reviewing a previous judgment. If it were, much inconvenience and confusion would be the result. If a judgment be liable to be reviewed on the ground of a new ruling, it can be reviewed even if the new ruling is made a long time after the decision of the case and there should be no difference in principle in reviewing a judgment after a month or two or after forty or fifty years. If a judgment can be reviewed after such a long time, the title of many persons would be insecure.

3. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied on Nawab Mirza Muhammad Bakar Ali Khan v. Muhammad Bakar, (07) 10 O.C. 291. In that case an appeal was filed before the District Judge on wrong advice given by counsel. It was ultimately found that the appeal ought to have been filed in the Judicial Commissioner's Court and it was held that there was sufficient cause for excusing the delay. That case is quite distinguishable from the present one. The other case relied on is Brindaban Chandra v. Damodar Prosad, AIR1925Cal304 . In that case an application for review of judgment was filed in time and when it came on for hearing a different interpretation was put by the Privy Council on a rule of Hindu law and it was held that that ruling could be considered in deciding the application for review. The third case relied on is Brij Inder Singh v. Kanshi Ram, A.I.R. 1917 P.C. 156. In that case it was held that the time occupied by an application in good faith for review should be deemed as added to the period for presenting an appeal. I think these oases are distinguishable. In my opinion there is no good ground for excusing the delay. The application is rejected with costs.