JUDGMENT

1. This is a second civil appeal by a plaintiff who was partially successful in the trial Court, but whose suit was wholly dismissed in first appeal. The plaintiff, Sita Ram, sued for a declaration that he was the owner of a third share in certain properties specified in lists A, B and C appended to the plaint, and for partition of this share. The Additional Civil Judge decreed the suit for partition of a third share of the property in list A only, this comprising immovable property. The defendants successfully appealed to the District Judge against this decree. We have heard arguments in this appeal at some length, but we do not propose to enter into the merits because we have come to the conclusion that the appeal must be allowed on the ground that the District Judge was incompetent to decide the appeal preferred in his Court. The valuation of the claim for the purpose of jurisdiction was stated in the plaint to be Rs. 5816-7-4, and the correctness of this figure has not been disputed. The same valuation is given in the memorandum of appeal filed in the District Judge's Court.

3. The actual amount involved in the first appeal was less than this, because only the property in list A was in issue. The valuation of the plaintiff's share in the property in this list is said to be Rs. 4430. This however is immaterial because under Section 39, Oudh Courts Act, an appeal lies to the District judge from a decree or order of a Subordinate Judge only where the value of the original suit in which the decree or order was made did not exceed Rs. 5000. There can be no doubt therefore that the valuation was in excess of the District Judge's pecuniary jurisdiction. There is nothing to show how the appeal came to be admitted by the District Judge, except for an office report that it lay to his Court. It is difficult to understand how this report was made, as para. 9 of the memorandum of appeal clearly gives the valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction as Rs. 5516-7-4, which is correct.

3. No objection was taken by the plaintiff on this ground before the District Judge and the point evidently escaped the notice both of the parties and of the Court itself. Nor was any objection taken in the memorandum of appeal filed in this Court. The earned Counsel for the appellant only drew our attention to the matter in the course of arguments. If the District Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal his decree is a nullity and it is incumbent upon us to consider this objection however late it may have been brought to our notice. It has been contended by the earned Counsel for the respondents that it is not a case of inherent incompetency of the District Judge, but only a case of irregular exercise of jurisdiction. He has referred us to several eases in which this distinction has been drawn. But these authorities only show that there has been an irregular exercise of jurisdiction which is not fatal where the defect is such as can be cured by Section 11, Suits Valuation Act, or Section 21, Civil P.C. Under the former section an objection that by reason of over-valuation or undervaluation of a suit a subordinate Court had not jurisdiction shall not be entertained by an appellate Court unless the objection was taken previously, or unless the appellate Court is satisfied that over-valuation or under-valuation has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit or the appeal on the merits. In the present case there is no question of over-valuation or undervaluation and so this section is not applicable. Nor does Section 21, Civil P.C., apply because that is concerned only with the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. We have not been referred to any authority supporting an extension of the principle contained in Section 11, Suits Valuation Act, and the authorities appear to us to indicate clearly that no extension could be allowed in a case of this kind where there is a want of inherent jurisdiction. We must therefore allow this appeal, hol