JUDGMENT

Mir Ahmad, J - Firm Mitha Shah Ram Ditta Mal sued the Firm Devi Dass Gulzari Lal for settlement of accounts, and for the recovery of Rs. 500 which the plaintiff-firm alleged were due to them The defendant-firm pleaded that there was a condition in the contract between the parties that in case of dispute, the matter shall be referred to arbitration, and urged that the suit should be stayed under Section 34, Arbitration Act, so that the arbitrators named in the contract should be appointed as stipulated. During the proceedings the parties decided to refer their dispute-to the arbitration of a certain person, independently of the arbitration clause in the contract. The representative of the plaintiff-firm signed the reference, and Devi Dass of the defendant-firm also subscribed to it. His son Gulzari Lal did not sign it. Gulzari Lal applied later for the cancellation of the order of reference on the ground that he was not a party to it. The Judge superseded the arbitration. The plaintiff-firm appealed to the Senior Sub-Judge against this order. The Senior Sub-Judge accepted the appeal and set aside the order superseding the arbitration. The defendant-firm came up on revision to this Court against that order. The judgment of the Bench given in the case is reported in Firm Devi Dass Gulzari Lal v. Firm Mitha Shah Ramditta Mal A.I.R. 1943 Pesh. 8. The Bench held that no appeal was permissible against the order of the original Judge superseding the arbitration, and that the order of the Senior Sub-Judge was, therefore, without jurisdiction. That order was, consequently, vacated. The Bench, refused to consider the order of the original Judge direct, because it was of an interlocutory nature and was not open to question on revision. On remand the original Judge held that the arbitration clause in the contract was binding on the parties. He, therefore, stayed the suit under Section 34, Arbitration Act. The plaintiff-firm appealed against this order to the Senior Sub-Judge. One of the grounds taken was that the original order of the trial Judge, superseding the arbitration in Court was wrong. The Senior Sub-Judge refused to consider the propriety or otherwise of the previous order of the trial Judge, superseding arbitration. He agreed with that Judge that the arbitration clause was binding, and dismissed the appeal. The plaintiff-firm has come up on revision to this Court.

2. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff-firm has urged that both on appeal before the Senior Sub-Judge, and now on revision he had a right to question the original order, superseding the reference to arbitration entered into in Court. As the matter involved a point of law, which was very interesting, and on which authorities were conflicting, the case was referred to the Bench. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has pointed out that under Section 105, Civil P.C., any order which may not itself be appealable could be questioned, when the final decree in the case is appealed from. He then turned to Section 108, Civil P.C., in which it is laid down that the provisions of Part VII (the part relating to appeals) for appeals from original decrees shall apply to appeals against orders. He took it to mean that interlocutory orders could be questioned when an appeal is preferred from a final order also. He, consequently, asked that he should be allowed to challenge the original order of the trial Judge, superseding the reference to arbitration entered into in Court, now that he was appealing from a stay order. He quoted two Single Judge authorities of the Madras High Court reported in Alagappa v. Annamalai A.I.R 1917 Mad. 404 and Muthayyan v. Narayana Swami A.I.R. 1936 Mad. 936. We do not see any force in the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. No doubt, an order, which cannot be appealed from, could be questioned when the final decree is passed, and an appeal preferred from it. Section 105, Civil P.C., is, however, explicit that it is only when there is a