1944 Supreme(Pesh) 16
HIGH COURT OF PESHAWAR
Almond, J.C
Faqir Mohd S/o Hajj Nur Mohd & Ors. – Appellants
Versus
Mt Tajwar Sultan W/O Major Mohd Ayub Khan & Anr. – Respondents
Decided On : 21-04-1944
JUDGMENT
Almond, J C - Akbar Khan sold the suit land to Faqir Mohammad and two others, and two pre-emption suits were instituted regarding the sale: one by Mt. Tajwar Sultan claiming as an owner in the estate and the' other by Hidayatullah claiming as the nephew of Akbar Khan. It was held in Hidayatullah's suit that he had waived his right to pre-emption and that decision has now become final. Mt. Tajwar Sultan was given a decree, and an appeal against it by the vendees was dismissed. The vendees have now presented this further appeal, and two points only are raised in the appeal. The first is that Mt. Tajwar Sultan could have no right of pre-emption, because Hidayatullah had sought to exercise his right by bringing a suit, and under the provisions of Section 15(c), Pre-emption Act, no person can claim under Clause (c) if any person having a right of pre-emption under Clause (a) or Clause (b) seeks to exercise it. There is some force in this contention on the plain reading of Section 15(c) as it stands by itself, but to put that interpretation on it would not be consistent with Section 28. Section 28 of the Act directs that where more suits than one arising out of the same sale are pending, the plaintiff in each suit shall be joined as defendant in each of the other suits, and in deciding the suits the Court shall in each decree state the order in which each claimant is entitled to exercise his right. In accordance with the plain reading of that section, if one person sought to pre-empt under Section 15(a) or (b) and another sought to pre-empt under Clause (c), then it would be the duty of the Court under Section 28 to state the order in which each claimant was entitled. We think, therefore, that there is no further meaning in the words "seeks to exercise it" under Section 15(c) than that persons entitled under Clause (c) are postponed to persons entitled under Clauses (a) and (b).
2. The second point which is taken is that the land in suit was not agricultural land, and was, therefore, not subject to pre-emption as such. This point was not taken either in the trial Court or in the grounds of appeal before the District Court. We are not prepared to entertain the question at this stage as it would require further evidence to come to a decision on the point. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
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