JUDGMENT

Almond, J C - The facts of this case are as follows: Miram Khan sued Malik Khan Badshah and two others as vendees and Gul Sarwar and Sheikh Sarwar as vendors for preemption of a certain piece of land on payment fit Rs. 80. The trial Court granted him a decree on 6th January 1943 for pre-emption on payment of Rs. 1500 and directed him to deposit the balance of Rs. 1420 by 29th January 1943, otherwise the suit to stand dismissed with costs. On 22nd January 1943 the, plaintiff preferred an appeal in the District Judge's Court questioning the amount which he was required to pay for pre-emption, and on the same date he applied for an extension of the time during which he might deposit the amount. This application came up on the same day before an Additional Judge, who made an ex parte order that the time was extended by two month The balance of the sum was duly deposited within that period of two months. The appeal came up for final hearing on 28th June 1943 and in giving the decision the Additional Judge maintained the finding of the trial Court that the sum which ; was to be paid was Rs. 1500 and he made the following remarks at the end of his judgment:

After the appeal was lodged the appellant applied to this Court for extension of time, and it was granted. This, in my opinion, could have been done under Section 148, Civil P.C., read with Order 20, Rule 14, Sub-section (1)(a). The appeal is dismissed with costs.

2. The decree-sheet itself merely stated that the appeal was dismissed with costs, and made no reference to the extension of time which had been granted to the plaintiff.

Against the decree of the Additional Judge the vendees have preferred this further appeal in which they contend that the order of the Additional Judge extending the time for the deposit of the money was without jurisdiction. The learned Counsel for the appellants has conceded that if the extension had been granted by the Additional Judge in disposing of the appeal from the decree and had been embodied in the Additional Judge's decree sheet, then, the order would have been legal though not justified on the merits, but he contends that by extending the time in an interlocutory order the Additional Judge acted beyond his jurisdiction.

3. The Additional Judge relied upon" the provisions of Section 148, Civil P.C. Virtually the consensus of opinion of the judgments to which we have been referred is that time for payment of the money under a pre-emption decree cannot be extended under Section 148, Civil P.C., by the trial Court at any rate, and there is also a preponderance of opinion that it cannot be extended under that section even by an appellate Court. One authority to this effect is Muhammad v. Charag (10) 8 I.C. 812, a judgment of a single Judge of the Lahore High Court, which held that neither the original nor the appellate Court could extend time under Section 148, Civil P.C., and that the appellate Court could not extend time except upon a regular appeal against the decree. Another authority is a Pull Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in Suranjan Singh v. Rambahal Lal (13) 35 All. 582 which was subsequently followed in another case of Lahore High Court reported in Labh Singh v. Ganpat A.I.R. 1923 Lah. 162. There is one judgment of the Lahore Chief Court to the contrary reported in Naba v. Pathana (13) 60 P.R. 1913. In Maslahuddin v. Ramkishen it was held that on an appeal from the decree the appellate Court had power to extend the time under which the deposit could be made, but that that power did not arise from Section 148, Civil P.C., but from Order 41, Rule 32 In Wasawa Singh v. Lal Singh (06) 48 P.R. 1906 it was held that an appellate Court could fix a fresh time under which the preemption money was to be deposited, but was not bound to do so. In Nathu Khan v. Gulab Khan (22) 64 I.C. 242 a judgment of the Lahore High Court, it was held that not even on an appeal from the decree could the appellate Court extend time for t