JUDGMENT

Carr, J - The plaintiff-appellant sued the defendant-respondents for money due on a promissory note. The note was executed on the ' 27th November 1919, and the suit was filed on the 13th November 1925 very nearly six years later. It was claimed in the plaint that the suit was within time by reason of a payment of Rs. 500 towards interest alleged to have been made on the 14th November 1922. The original borrowers were both dead, and the suit was against their legal representative who denied knowledge of the transaction and put the plaintiff appellant to strict proof of his claim. The learned Additional District Judge found that the plaintiff appellant's suit was time barred and accordingly dismissed it with costs.

2. The promissory note bears an endorsement in Tamil to the effect that Rs. 500, had been paid towards the note on the 14th November 1922. Immediately below this endorsement was another endorsement in Burmese purporting to be written and signed by Ko Kya Baw, the original borrower, regarding the payment of Rs. 500/. The date of this second endorsement is the 1st lazan of Tazaungmon, 1284, B.E. This is equivalent to the English date 20th October 1922. Thus, if the Burmese endorsement is correct, the money was paid more than three years before the institution of the suit, and the suit is time barred. The parties appear to have overlooked the difference in dates between these two endorsements, and this difference is not referred to in the evidence. Apparently it was not discovered until the learned Additional District Judge came to write his judgment. In his judgment he has made an incorrect statement. He says that according to the plaintiff the payment of interest was made on the 20th October 1923. The plaintiff-appellant has no where stated that this was the date. In all probability the word "plaintiff" is a clerical error for "promissory note;" but in any case the learned Additional District Judge should have dealt with this matter in somewhat more detail. As the case now stands, we have two endorsements on the promissory note, neither of which need be called in question in regard 'to its genuineness and good faith. The dates of these two differ: if one is correct, the suit is in time, if the other is correct, the suit is time-barred.

3. It is undoubtedly the duty of the plaintiff-appellant to prove that his suit is within time and to do that he must prove that the date given in the Tamil endorsement is correct. We are of opinion that he has not done this. The plaintiff-appellant himself said in his evidence that the money was paid on the 14th November 1922, but he is illiterate. He gives no reason why he should remember the exact date, and the probability is that ha is relying entirely on the Tamil endorsement. His 4th witness, A.V.A. Pillay, states that he himself wrote this Tamil endorsement at the time of payment of money, which was about three years ago. He does not say on what date the payment was actually made and in all probability, he could not remember, after such a lapse of time, its exact date. He is not questioned as to whether he can swear to the correctness of his endorsement. Perhaps had the question been put to him he would have sworn to it; but even then we should find some difficulty in accept-ting his statement as accurate after this lapse of time.

4. The existence of the two endorsements, differing in date, shows beyond doubt that one or other of the writers must have made a mistake; which of them was mistaken it is now impossible to say. There is no reason to suppose that U Kya Baw intentionally gave a wrong date to his endorsement. He could at that time have had no possible reason for doing so, and it seems to us that his endorsement is entitled to at least as much weight as the endorsement written by Pillay.

5. The result is that it remains decidedly uncertain whether the payment was made on the 20th October or on the 14th November 1922. That being so, we consider it impossible to hold that