JUDGMENT

Baguley, J - One Daw Unit died levying a considerable estate. There were Letters of Administration proceedings contested between Po Lein and Ma Hnirs Hlaing with regard to the property which she left behind. Eventually by an order of the High Court, Letters of Administration were issued to Ma Hnin Hlaing. After orders had been passed the P.A.R.P. firm sued on three promissory notes alleged to have been executed by Daw Hnit, Ma Hnin Hlaing and Tun Pe. The latter was sued personally as an executant, and Ma Hnin Hlaing was sued personally and also as, administratrix of Daw Hnit.

2. Meantime Po Lein applied to this Court for leave to appeal to the Privy Council. At the same time he asked that a Receiver be appointed to defend Daw Haiti's estate against being wasted. The allegation was that he feared that Ma Hnin Hlaing was wasting the estate and not fighting the creditors of the estate properly. His application was filed on 6th December 1926 is the High Court. In the affidavit he specially refers to the suit filed by the P.A.R.P. firm, No. 38 of 1926 of the District. Court of Pegu, which was then pending and be alleged the firm was likely to get a decree by consent or ex parte. In the end, on 15th February 1927, a Bench of this Court appointed a Receiver whose functions were to be limited strictly to the following:

He shall be empowered to take steps to recover possession for the estate of the laud at present in the occupation of U Nanc U ; to apply to bus joined as a defendant in Civil Regular Suit No. 33 of 1926 of the District Court of Pegu ; and to defend such suit or any-other suits which creditors may bring, or have brought, against the estate of the late Dciw Hnit.

3. Unfortunately on the date that this order was passed, 15th February Civil Regular No. 33 of 1926 had already been decided, for the two original defendants confessed judgment and a decree was passed on 1st February 1927. This was apparently not known by the Banch of this Court that passed the order appointing the Receiver.

4. Still, it would seem, under the impression that the suit was still pending, the Receiver filed an application to be brought on the record of Civil Regular 38 and to be allowed to defend the suit. On discovering the actual state of affairs the Receiver withdrew his application on 25th May 1927. On 8th June the Receiver filed a fresh application asking that the case might be reopened and that he might be joined as a defendant. The application was made under Civil Procedure Code, Section 151 as there was no other provision of the law under which it could have been made. The District Judge finally rejected the application on 8th August 1927, and it is against this order that the present application in revision has been filed.

5. The learned District Judge does not seem fully to have realized that the two applications made by the Receiver appointed by this Court were quite distinct and totally different. The first one was filed under the impression that the case, No. 38 of 1926, was still pending and could be fought, an impression. I might note, which prevailed in the High Court at the time that the order appointing him was made. His second application was made after he had discovered that a decree had already been passed in case No. 38, and in it he invoked, for the first time, Section 151, Civil P.C., for that seemed to him to be the only section to which, under the very peculiar circumstances of the case, he was in a position to appeal.

6. The learned District Judge in his order rejecting the second application made by the Receiver seems to have regarded the Receiver as being merely a second manifestation of Po Lein. It is true that Po Lein has got to pay all the expenses incurred by the Receiver, but the Receiver is an officer appointed by the High Court for a specific purpose. Po Lein's actions do not bind him, and the sins of Po Lein must not be visited on the Receiver. It is largely, I think, because he regarded Po Lein and the Receive