JUDGMENT

1. In this case the petitioner, Ma Paw, laid an information at the Ngazun Police Station, Sagaing District, charging Ba Hein and Ba Si with robbery. The police investigated the case, found it to be false and threw it out, whereupon she filed a complaint in the Court of the Special Power Magistrate, Sagaing, making the same allegations. The Magistrate examined her on oath and sent the papers to the police for inquiry and report under Section 202, Criminal P.C. In the meantime the police laid a complaint against her under Section 182, I.P.C., in the Court of the Additional Magistrate, Ngazun. Later, on receipt of the police report, the Special Power Magistrate threw out the complaint of the petitioner under Section 203, Criminal P.C.; he however omitted to pass any order as regards classification. On the complaint made by the police the petitioner was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 100 or, in default to suffer 1 1/2 months' rigorous imprisonment. She appealed, but her appeal was dismissed by the District Magistrate of Sagaing. She now seeks the interference of this Court in revision on the ground that where information to the police amounting to a false charge within the meaning of Section 211, I.P.C., is followed by a complaint to the Court based on the same allegations as in this case, prosecution and conviction under Section 182, I.P.C., is illegal. In support of this ground reliance is placed on the case of Rambrose v. Emperor A.I.R. 1928 Rang. 254. This case has now been referred to a Bench in order that the correctness of the decision given in that case may be considered. The facts of that case are very similar to the facts of the present case. In that case the accused laid a false charge of robbery and hurt in an information made to the police which was, after inquiry, thrown out. Subsequently, the accused filed a complaint in Court for the same offence and the Magistrate dismissed it as false on the Police report, whereupon the police laid a complaint against the accused under Section 182, I.P.C. The accused thereupon moved this Court to quash the proceedings.

2. On these facts Mya Bu, J., held, following Brown v. Ananda Lal Mullick [1917] 44 Cal. 650 and Muhammad Yasgin v. Eniperor A.I.R. 1925 Pat. 483, that although the offence alleged against the petitioner fell under both Sections 182 and 211, I.P.C., prosecution under Section 182 was improper. Such a prosecution would, he considered, be contrary to the general principle that a prosecution for a lesser offence should not be launched when the facts constitute a graver offence. It must be noted that in that case the trial was still at an early stage and the result of the order was the quashing of certain pending proceedings. In our opinion a close examination of the authorities quoted will scarcely support the deductions that have been made from them.

3. In the case of Brown v. Ananda Lal Mullick [1917] 44 Cal. 650, although the facts with regard to the false information to the police and the subsequent complaint to the Magistrate were the same as in the present case, the point for determination was whether the man who laid the false information could be prosecuted under Section 211, I.P.C., without the sanction or complaint of the Court itself. There was no charge in that case which fell under Section 182, I.P.C.; and on p. 655, the following passage can be found in the Judgment:

If Ananda Lal Mullick had based his charge on Section 182, I.P.C., which he might have done, the sanction of the police officer to whom the alleged false charge was made, or the sanction of some public servant to whom he was subordinate would have been necessary.

4. Although this remark in essence may be regarded as obiter, it does in a way suggest that the conviction in the present case, which is under Section 182, I.P.C., would be quite legal. In our opinion this case does not support the contention that on these facts a conviction under Section 182, I.P.C., is illegal.