JUDGMENT

Leach, J - This case comes before me on a reference by the Taxing Master with regard to the court-fee to be paid by the appellants, In Civil Regular Suit No. 14 of 1933 of the Assistant District Court of Mandalay the appellants sued for an injunction restraining the Mandalay Municipal Committee from selling the right of occupancy of certain meat stalls in the Ywahaing Bazaar, Mandalay, in violation of rights claimed by the appellants. The suit was valued for the purposes of jurisdiction but there was no valuation of the relief sought, as required by Section 7(iv), Court-fees Act, 1870, the valuation clause being in the following terms:

That the suit is valued at Rs. 10,000 for the purpose of jurisdiction, and a court-fee of Rs. 10 is paid, the suit being one for perpetual injunction.

2. No question was raised in the Assistant District Judge's Court as to the sufficiency of the court-fee paid, and the case proceeded to trial. The Assistant District Judge dismissed the suit, and the appellants have appealed to this Court. As in the case of the plaint, the memorandum of appeal bears a stamp of the value of Rs. 10. When the memorandum was first filed it contained a valuation for jurisdiction, but no valuation of the relief sought. This omission having been pointed out to the appellants, they declared the value of the relief sought to be Rs. 130, the amount covered by the court-fee of Rs. 10 already paid, The Deputy Registrar of the Appellate Side of this Court, whose duty it is to check the correctness of court-fees paid by appellants, took the view that the appellants should be called upon to pay in respect of their memorandum of appeal a court-fee based on their valuation for jurisdiction, which value they declared to be Rs. 10,000, and that they should also be required to make up the deficiency, calculated on this basis, in the court-fee paid on the plaint. The Deputy Registrar placed the matter before the Taxing Master, who has referred it to me as the Judge appointed under Section 5, Court-fees Act, to deal with questions regarding court-fees which are of general importance. It is quite clear that Section 5, Court-fees Act, gives me no jurisdiction to decide questions with regard to the sufficiency of court-fees paid in subordinate Courts. I have jurisdiction only to deal with questions relating to court-fees in the High Court. In this case I am merely concerned with the court-fee on the memorandum of appeal. This the learned Government Advocate admitted at the outset of his argument. The question of the sufficiency of the court-fee paid in the Assistant District Judge's Court can only be dealt with under the provisions of Section 12(ii), Court-fees Act, by the Court hearing the appeal. In deciding what fee is payable on the memorandum of appeal regard must be had to the provisions of Section 7(iv), Court, fees Act and Section 8. Suits Valuation Act, 1887. Section 7(iv), Court-fees Act, provides that in the case of a suit according to the amount at which "the relief sought" is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal. It is specifically provided that in such a suit the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought. When the suit out of which the present appeal arises was filed the Assistant District Judge should have returned the plaint to the appellants to value the injunction, which was the relief the appellants were seeking. They could have valued it at whatever figure they thought fit. The valuation of the relief sought in a suit for an injunction is left entirely to the discretion of the plaintiff or the appellant as the case may be and the Court is not entitled to question the correctness of the amount so declared: Sunderabai v. Collector of Belgaum 1918 P.C. 135, Faizullah Khan v. Mauladad Khan 1929 P.C. 147 and C.K. Ummar v. C.K. Ali Ummar 1931 Rang. 146.

3. Section 8, Suits Valuation Act, 1887, provides that where in suits other than those referred to in the Court-fees Act, Section 7,