1934 Supreme(Rang) 24
HIGH COURT OF RANGOON
Dunkley, J.
U Po Yin – Appellant
Versus
U Ba Chit – Respondent
Decided On : 21-06-1934
JUDGMENT
Dunkley, J - The plaintiff-respondent as the receiver in insolvency of the estate of one Hiru, brought a suit upon a promissory note against the defendant-appellant. The defence was that the suit was barred by the law of limitation, and admittedly the promissory note was, on the face of it, time-barred. It was however pleaded on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent that the defendant-appellant had made an acknowledgment of indebtedness, which was sufficient within the meaning of the provisions of Section 19, Limitation Act, to give a fresh starting point to the period of limitation, and the sole point which is now for decision before me, and in fact was the sole point for decision before both the lower Courts, is whether there was such an acknowledgment sufficient to satisfy the provisions of Section 19, Limitation Act, and to make a fresh starting point of limitation, so as to bring the suit with in time. The acknowledgment upon which the plaintiff-respondent relied is contained in a deposition of the defendant-appellant, made as a witness in insolvency case No. 76 of 1931, of the District Court of Pegu. At the beginning of his deposition he made the following statement, according to the record:
I borrowed Rs. 600 from the respondent on a promissory note. It is the exhibit promissory note.
2. This deposition was recorded in accordance with the provisions of Rule 5, Order 18, Civil P.C., as substituted by the Rule Committee of this Court. At the end of the deposition there is the signature of the Additional Judge of the District Court underneath the certificate "read over and acknowledged correct," and there is also the signature of a clerk under the further certificate "read over by me in Burmese and acknowledged correct." Section 19, Limitation Act, lays down that:
Where, before the expiration of the period prescribed for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed...a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed;
and the second explanation to Section 19 says that:
For the purposes of this section 'signed' means signed either personally or by an agent duly authorized in this behalf.
3. Consequently, in order to save limitation it is necessary, first, that the acknowledgment of liability should be made in writing, and, secondly, that this writing, should be signed by the party whom it is sought to make liable, or by an agent of that party duly authorized in this behalf, that is, for the purpose of making such acknowledgment. It is admitted in this case that the acknowledgment has not been signed by the appellant, and the case for the respondent is that the clerk who has signed the certificate at the end of the deposition was the agent of the appellant for the purpose of making such acknowledgment of indebtedness. This is a contention with which I find it impossible to agree. In Kapur Chand v. Narinjan Lal 1918 Mah. 248, it was laid down by the Chief Judge of the Chief Court of the Punjab that a deposition made by the defendant in another case, which was not signed by him or by his duly authorized agent, did not fulfil the requirements of Section 19, Limitation Act, and this is a decision with which I am in full agreement. On behalf of the respondent a number of rulings of the Madras High Court have been quoted in support of the contention that the signing of the deposition of the appellant by the Judge of the Court or by the clerk of the Court must be a signing by them as agents of the appellant. In the two earlier cases of the Madras High Court, which have been cited, that is Venkata v. Parthasaradhi (1993) 16 Mad. 220 and Periavenkan Udaya Tevar v. Subramanian Chetti (1897) 20 Mad. 239, it is specifically stated that the, depositions in question were signed by the debtor, and consequently it is clear