JUDGMENT

Mackney, J - The plaintiff-appellant, Daw Mya is the widow of one Po San-who was the only son of U Pha Yo, deceased. She originally applied on 16th May 1932 in the District Court of Pegu for permission to sue as a pauper for recovery of a sum of Rs. 9,000 odd being, the amount of unpaid purchase money still due by U Po Mya, the defendant-respondent, on account of a certain piece of land purchased by him in the following circumstances:

It was alleged that this land belonged1 to Maung Po San but had been entrusted by him to his father U Pha Yo. U Pha Yo had fraudulently conveyed the land by registered deed of sale to U Po Mya or an alleged consideration of Rs. 10,000, which was never paid. Subsequently however U Po Mya had acknowledged his liability and bad paid to Maung Po San a sum of Rs. 5,055 in respect of this sale. Daw Ms a asked for a decree for the balance as she was the legal representative of both U Pha Yoand Maung Po San. In his written statement U Po Mya pointed out that the suit was barred by limitation. The sale had taken place on 8th November 1924. Article 3, Limitation Act, applied, and therefore Daw Mya was not entitled to a personal decree. Daw Mya, presumably under advice, then filed an amended plaint setting forth the same facts but asking for a different relief. She now relied on Section 55(4)(b), T.P. Act, whereby the seller of a property is entitled

where the ownership of the property has passed to the buyer before payment of the whole of the purchase money, to a charge upon the property in the hands of the buyer, * * * * for the amount of the purchase money or any part thereof remaining unpaid, and for interest on such amount or part * * * *.

2. The respondent raised the point that she should not be allowed to amend her plaint in this way and so deprive him of his defence of limitation, inasmuch as for such a relief as Daw Mya now claimed. Article 132, Limitation Act, applied and the period of limitation is twelve years. Daw Mya had been allowed to sue as a pauper but the District Court accepted the respondent's plea and disallowed the amendment and dismissed the suit on the ground that it was barred by limitation. Against this decision Daw Mya has now obtained permission to appeal as a pauper. It appears to me that the appeal must be allowed. In effect the cause of action has not been altered at all. The facts alleged are identical. The appellant now merely wishes to rely on the legal plea of which she was formerly not aware. At the time she filed her original plaint, and now also, she is still entitled to sue for the relief claimed. She is not barred by limitation. The view taken by the District Court might have been correct had the period of limitation expired before she filed her amended plaint. There can be no doubt that on the facts alleged a charge was created on the property. It surely would be most unjust to deprive a suitor of her rights simply because she was not at first aware of their full extent. The respondent will not be deprived of any defence which he might have put forward before the amendment, nor has any new method of defence been opened to him by her delay. His present contention in effect is that he should be allowed to take advantage of an oversight on the part of Daw Mya and her advocate. This, I consider, would be most inequitable. If in certain cases it is permissible to allow an amendment of a plaint, which alters to some extent the cause of action enabling a plaintiff to sue, surely it is permissible to allow a plaintiff without amending his cause of action to amend his prayer for relief when it is a relief which he was always, and is now, entitled to claim. The decision in Ma Ein Zi v. Mi Ni (1913) 1 U.B.R. 175, on which the District Court relied, is clearly not applicable in the present case. There it was a question of bringing on the record the legal representatives of a party after the period of limitation for such an application had expired. An appeal had been prefer