JUDGMENT

Dunkley, J - The plaintiff-respondent, L.P.L. Letchumanan Chettyar, brought a suit upon a promissory note against the defendants-appellants and be has been successful in the Sub-divisional Court and also on appeal to the District Court. This second appeal there, fore lies solely on points of law. On the 10th June 1932, the defendants-appellants executed a promissory note for a sum of Rs. 3,000 in favour of P.V.P.R.V.R. Somaeundaram Chettyar, and the operative part of this note is as follows: "We promise to pay to the said P.V.P.R.V.R. Somasundaram Chettyar Avergal or to his order". This promissory note was endorsed in blank in the name of P.V.P.R.V.R. Veenaitheerthan Chettyar. There is evidence to show that this Veenaitheerthan Chettyar is the sole proprietor of the firm designated by the letters P.V.P.R.V.R., and this evidence cannot, of course, now be disputed. Two points have been raised in this appeal. The first is as to the competency of the person, Duraisamy, who filed the suit on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, to bring the suit. The plaint is headed:

L.P.L. Letchumanan Chettyai, carrying on money lending business at Bogale, under the style of L.P.L. by agent Nuthaiya Chettyar and by sub-agent Duraisamy.

2. Reference has been made on behalf of the present appellants to the provisions of Section 190 of the Contract Act, which prohibit the appointment of a sub-agent. But, as has been rightly pointed out on behalf of the respondent, this matter was not raised in the written statement of the appellants in the original suit, nor was it raised on first appeal in the District Court, and at the time the suit was filed the usual application, supported by affidavit, was made by Duraisamy for permission to sign and verify the plaint, and therefore, to file the suit, and this application was allowed in the Sub-divisional Court. Consequently, as no objection was taken by the appellants at that time to the competency of the sub-agent, Duraisamy, to bring the suit, I am of opinion that it is not open to the appellants to raise this point now. If it had been raised at the time, it is quite possible, or even probable, that the powers-of-attorney granted by Letchumanan Chettyar to Muthaiya Chettyar and by the latter to his subagent, Duraisamy, would on inspection have disclosed that Duraisamy had been properly appointed and was competent to file a suit on behalf of the L.P.L. firm.

3. The second point which has been raised is that the endorsement by Veenaitheerthan Chettyar is an invalid endorsement, because he was incompetent to en. dorse it. The ground on which this contention is based is that the promissory note made the amount payable to Soma, sundaram Chettyar or his order and that under Section 92 of the evidence Act no evi-diehce to show that this amount was intended to be payable to any other person could be led, and, consequently, it could not be shown that the amount was payable to a firm designated by the letters P.V.P.R.V.R., and that, therefore, it followed that the proprietor of that firm would have no authority to endorse in blank a promissory note which was payable to, or to the order of, a certain Somasundaram, who may or may not have been his agent. In regard to this matter two cases have been cited. They are Sadasuk Janki Das v. Kishan Pershad 1918 P.C. 146 and Perchiappa Chettyar v. Muniyandi Servai 1932 Rang. 97. Both these cases are in the contrary sense, to that which is now before me, as they are to the effect that when it is sought to charge a principal upon a negotiable instrument, then the name of the person or firm to be charged must be clearly stated, so that the responsibility is made plain and can be instantly recognized as the document passes from hand to hand. But, as I have said, the case now under consideration is the exact opposite of this proposition, for it is not a question of the P.V.P.R.V.R. firm being made liable upon the instrument, but a question as to whether the payee is Somasundaram